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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the progress of technological development during the interwar
period of 1919 to 1939. The interwar period was a time of slashed military budgets and
isolationist policies. However, despite political, financial, and organizational handicaps, each
branch of the military made significant progress in the development of military technology, and
the air corps and navy achieved significantly better results. The reason these two branches were
able succeed was through a combination of organizational policy and the development of an
overarching goal for their respective branch. Within this thesis, I investigated each of the major
military branches during the interwar period, specifically the United States Army, Army Air
Corps, and Navy. The air corps is considered a separate branch despite being a segment of the
army due to its different strategic goal and its growing independence during the interwar period.
In my research I found that the army made by far the least technological progress, but did
make significant strides in terms of the development of individual components for larger
projects. For example, the army developed the M1 rifle and state-of-the-art shock absorbers for
tanks. The air corps succeeded in transforming from a small army auxiliary made up of woodand-fabric biplanes into a largely independent branch of the military made up of all-metal
monoplane bombers. The navy developed the aircraft carrier and aircraft to accompany the new
ships, in addition to making substantial upgrades to existing ships. These upgrades included
strengthening ships against torpedo attacks, making engines more efficient, and adding antiaircraft guns to the ships‟ arsenals.
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INTRODUCTION
The First and Second World Wars were two of the most monumental events of the
twentieth century. Conjointly, they left a lasting impression on the fields of international politics,
both popular and academic history, literature, cinema, and popular culture. Almost anyone in
America can talk about the major players on each side, the elementary causes of the wars, and
most college graduates possess some understanding of how the end of the First World War set
the stage for the Second. However, not many could explain what became of the United States‟
military between the two wars.
World War I saw a number of major achievements in military technology. In this conflict,
the armies amassed in Europe witnessed the first major use of machine guns and the introduction
of military aircraft. The tank also appeared on the battlefield for the first time. The power, range,
and accuracy of artillery increased dramatically. Submarines and aircraft added a third dimension
to battles at sea, threatening ships from both below and above the ocean. The first proto-aircraft
carriers appeared, formed by cutting the top off an existing ship and replacing it with a platform.
Battleships, masters of the high seas, shelled each other from farther distances and with
increasingly massive rounds. In a more subtle advance, trucks and other vehicles began to
replace the horse as the primary method of transportation of men and material.
Twenty-one years after the 1918 cease-fire, World War II erupted, displaying a massive
improvement in all these areas of military technology. Aircraft could fly faster and higher. Tanks
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were more mobile, better armored, and at the forefront of the German blitzkrieg. Aircraft carriers
challenged the battleship for mastery of the sea.
However, between these two conflicts, the United States military faced both internal and
external resistance to technological developments, especially within the army. The period
between 1918 and 1939 witnessed a return to pre-war organizational policies for the army, the
emergence of isolationist politics, and a shrunken budget for all three branches. These events
preceded a catastrophic economic crash that shook the foundations of the country. In addition,
within the army, there were those who resisted further modernization of wartime tactics and war
machines, preferring to continue using the tools that were proven failures even before America‟s
entry into the First World War. However, during the two-decade period between 1919 and 1939,
the United States military, especially the air corps and navy, managed to enact a number of
substantial technological gains that greatly increased its ability to become the world power it is
today.
The purpose of this thesis is to determine how the United States military made
technological advances in spite of both internal and external pressures against it, as well as why
the air corps and the navy had much greater success than the army. It should be made clear that
individual improvements to specific technology are not the focus, although specific examples
will be used to highlight progress. Instead, this thesis will examine the individuals and
institutions that made this progress possible in the face of the largely anti-military culture present
in the 1920s and 1930s. I will attempt to answer the following question: how did the air corps
2

and navy overcome organizational, budgetary and political issues, and how did they manage to
make progress despite these hurdles? In addition, why was the army so much less successful in
this respect? Finally, how did the technological developments that originated in this era,
specifically in the navy and air corps, permit the United States to successfully engage in World
War II?
The historiography of American military history for the first half of the twentieth century
concentrates largely on the First and Second World Wars. However, the period between the wars
is largely ignored, especially in the area of technological development; specifically in the areas
of aircraft, aircraft carriers, tanks, artillery, and firearms. Most of the historiography on this
subject either focuses on individual branch achievements, or simply points to the interwar
period‟s isolationist policies and budget issues to explain why certain technologies were not
developed. However, I believe that this is an oversimplification; many advances were made
despite isolationism and budget shortfalls, especially in the air corps and the navy.
This thesis is unique in that it identifies not only the technological developments that
occurred during the interwar period, but also clarifies the difficulties and hurdles inherent in the
political situation at the time, and how each military branch dealt with that reality. I explain how
the air corps and the navy were able to make significant strides despite political problems by
having a unified command structure and a common goal throughout the branch, which is an
observation that has yet to be made in the field. In addition, I will show that the army was less
successful in overcoming similar hurdles due to the lack of an efficient command structure and
3

overarching goal. Understanding how the various political, economic, and organizational factors
worked together to hinder technological progress within the army is essential to understanding
how the navy and air corps averted this same lack of progress. All three branches suffered budget
cuts, all three faced isolationist policies, and all three, at least initially, were ruled by an
inefficient command structure. Somehow, the air corps and navy successfully overcame these
factors, while the army developed to a much lesser extent.
To explain this disparity in achievement, I will primarily be relying on the annual reports
published by the heads of each of the military branches. These include but are not limited to the
annual reports of the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War in charge of procurement
of materials, the Assistant Secretary of War for the US Air Corps, the US Army Chief of Staff,
the Secretary of the US Navy and the Chief of US Naval Aviation. In addition to these reports, I
will also use sources published by lower-rank individuals with special knowledge regarding
technological and tactical progress. Among these is the naval periodical, the United States Naval
Proceedings. Published by the navy and in print for nearly a century, it is a forum for naval
officers to express their concerns about naval policy and publish their research, observations, and
findings. Proceedings can, as a whole, be seen as a reflection of naval policy. I will also examine
all of the treaties and acts which had a substantial impact on the performance and size of the US
military.
There is a fairly stunning lack of historical work done on technological progress itself in
the interwar period, considering how much the progress influenced how World War II was
4

fought. Most of what can be found on the subject must be gleaned from works either covering a
much longer period of time, or works written about World War II. The leading work on the
subject, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, edited by Williamson Murray and Allan
Millet, does focus specifically on this era, but primarily from a British and German perspective,
using American innovation only as a comparison.1
For general military texts, Russell Weigley‟s The American Way of War and, Benjamin
Rhodes‟s United States Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period are essential texts.2 Weigley
discusses the strategies for both the air corps and the navy, and the technological advances
associated with those strategies. Rhodes focuses on the diplomatic side of the interwar period,
and explains the domestic policies that deeply affected actions of the various military branches.
Harold Winton‟s and David R. Mets‟s The Challenge of Change, Edward Coffman‟s The
Regulars, Weigley‟s History of the United States Army, and George Hofmann‟s Through
Mobility We Conquer discuss the army‟s technological developments.3 Weigley provides a good
general overview of the technology of the period, while Winton, Mets, and Hofmann describe
the failure of the army to adapt to the new technological realities following World War I.
Coffman gives a view of life within the army from the trooper‟s perspective and the struggles
1

Williamson Murray and Allan Reed Millett. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996).
2
Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy,
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973).; Benjamin Rhodes, United States Foreign Policy in the Interwar
Period, 1918-1941: The Golden Age of American Diplomatic and Military Complacency. (Westport, Conn: Praeger,
2001).
3
Harold R. Winton, and David R. Mets. The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 19181941, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2000).; Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army, 18981941, (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004).; Russell Frank Weigley, History of the
United States Army, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).; George F. Hofmann, Through Mobility We
Conquer: The Mechanization of U.S. Cavalry, (Lexington, Ky: University Press of Kentucky, 2006).
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associated with a peace-time isolationist army. The weakness of these three texts is the lack of
discussion about the combination of a funding deficit, poor organization, personal ideologies,
and how these factors combined to hinder technological progress.
Robert Love Jr.‟s History of the U.S. Navy is the preeminent book for naval history, but is
fairly general simply because of its scope; it covers the period from 1775 to 1941.4 There are a
number of supplemental sources, most describing the rise of the aircraft carrier, but many of
those works focus primarily on World War II and later. The air corps has a plethora of secondary
sources, most of them focusing on Billy Mitchell, the air corps deputy director and public face
during the 1920s, but also many focusing specifically on the new technological developments. In
terms of the historiography, this is a small, but very important, hole to fill: despite the air corps
being part of the army, their fates were quite different in this period, and there is no
historiographical work on that topic.
Within this thesis, I will be looking at each of the major military branches of the interwar
period, specifically the United States Army, Army Air Corps, and Navy. The air corps will be
considered a separate branch despite being part of the army due to its different strategic goal and
its growing independence during the interwar period. The marines are not included because they
were, at the time, not a major branch and did not meaningfully expand until after World War II
began.

4

Robert W. Love, Jr., History of the U.S. Navy, Volume I, 1775-1941, (Harrisburg, Stackpole Books, 1992).
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This work will be divided into three chapters, each focusing on the army, air corps, and
navy. By dividing the chapters by service, rather than chronologically, it avoids the confusion
caused by the lack of clear-cut lines in the chronology shared by all three branches. For example,
one could consider the years 1935-1939 important for the air corps due to the introduction of the
General Headquarters Air Corps; an important step in the air corps‟ move towards independence
from the army. However, these dates would not significantly affect the navy or army. For the
sake of clarity, each chapter will begin at the end of the First World War and conclude at the
resumption of hostilities in Europe in 1939. Although the United States did not enter World War
II until 1941, with the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, America rapidly began a
rearming program across all the branches, ending the political and budgetary characteristics that
define the interwar period.
Within this paper, I will show that, despite budget cuts, isolationist government policies,
and organizational issues, each branch of the military was able to make technological progress.
However, the navy and air corps achieved much more success by overcoming their
organizational issues and finding a goal to unite the branch. The army‟s reversion to an
antiquated command system that divided authority rather than concentrating it became the first in
a series of blows that ended any hope of the army exiting the interwar period as a world power.
When Congress cut both the army‟s budget and manpower in the early 1920s, this inefficient
system was not able to work together to form a unified goal for the army; instead, each
department continued to only work their projects, often at the expense of other departments. In
addition, several of the department heads did not believe in the mechanization of the army, and
7

preferred to continue to rely on animal-power. This further limited any potential progress the
army could have obtained.
The army‟s air service found itself in an even worse manpower and budget situation than
its parent branch at the end of World War I, and rapidly began to run out of both planes and
pilots to fly them. However, through the efforts of one of its senior officers, Billy Mitchell, army
pilots proved that air power had a real potential military application. Over the course of the
interwar period, the air corps unified its command structure and gained more and more
independence from the army, in terms of funding, purpose, and command. Because of this
independence, the air corps succeeded in progressing on a number of technological fronts and
built itself a niche within the military establishment.
The navy did not find itself mired in budgetary squalor immediately after World War I; in
fact, it continued to expand. In addition, shortly after the end of the war, the navy did away with
the same inefficient command system that would plague the army for the next two decades.
However, in the early 1920s, Congress enacted an international naval treaty that limited the
number of ships the navy could build and severely cut its budget. In response, the navy
developed a philosophy of quality-over-quantity, and worked to improve its ship‟s systems as
much as possible. In addition, after the air corps showed the potential of air power, the navy
developed the aircraft carrier and the aircraft to go with it.
It is clear that air corps and navy succeeded in developing technologically by creating an
efficient command structure, and then finding a goal for the entire branch to strive for. The air
8

corps found a place for itself within the military establishment, and when the navy could not
build more ships, they instead made the ships they had better. The army, lacking both of these
qualities, did not succeed in developing new technology at any meaningful rate, and ended the
interwar period technologically stunted.
In the current era of massive military budgets, growing national debt, and a weariness of
war on the part of both soldiers and civilians in America, it is entirely possible that we may be
entering another age of isolationism in the United States. At the very least, the military is facing
potentially large cuts to their research and development programs. As of April 2011, President
Barak Obama plans to reduce military spending by up to $400 billion over the next ten years.5
Other cuts proposed by members of Congress could reach up to $1 trillion, or twenty percent of
the military‟s total budget.6 With the potential of deep budget cuts in its future, the military
establishment would be wise to look to its past and examine how their predecessors succeeded
(and failed) in developing technologically during the interwar period in the face of a smaller
budget and a war-weary nation.

5

Robert Burns, “Gates: Big Budget Cuts Will Diminish US Influence,” ABC NEWS, May 24, 2011,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13671508
6
Robert Dreyfuss, “The Nation: Taking Aim At The Military Budget” NPR, March 31, 2011,
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/31/135004951/the-nation-taking-aim-at-the-pentagon-budget
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Many of the military‟s successes and failures during the interwar period can be traced to
events that occurred between the turn of the century and the beginning of World War I. During
this time, the existing branches of the military that are discussed underwent many changes that
paved the way for the changes in technology – and implementation – that occurred at a later date.
In order to completely understand how the military branches performed in the task of
technological development, it is necessary to first briefly look back at the events that each branch
underwent preceding the interwar period.
Prior to World War I, both the army and the navy operated under what was known as the
bureau system. Under this system, the army and navy split themselves into departments, each in
charge of a specific aspect of their branch. The problem with the bureau system was that each
individual bureau focused only on the needs, requirements, and goals of its own department, and
would ignore the needs and goals of other departments and the branch as a whole. When the
military remained small and did not require much in the way of equipment or ordinance, the
system did work. However, when the military rapidly expanded in the face of World War I, the
bureau system simply could not keep up with demand. Aviation eventually became a department
in both the army and the navy, and played a role in how each branch dealt with the inefficiencies
of the bureau system.
The army‟s use of the bureau system greatly affected its readiness for the first world war.
Following the Spanish-American War, the army moved from being essentially a frontier police
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force to an imperial power, with responsibilities both in the Caribbean and Pacific Rim.7
Between 1903 and 1916, the army expanded in size through a series of congressional acts,
beginning with the Dick Act of 1903 and ending with the National Defense Act of 1916, the last
act passed before America‟s entrance into World War I.8 However, even these expansions left
America unprepared for the war. America entered the war on April 6, 1917 with an army of
127,588 men with an additional 181,620 national guardsmen, for a total of 309,208 men at arms.
As a comparison, in the same month the French and Germans lost a combined 290,000 men
during the Battle of Aisne.9
In 1917, the army underwent a monumental expansion program to meet the manpower
requirements of World War I. At this time there were as many as eight different, yet concurrent,
systems in place for estimating the requirements of the army, including the Bureau of Ordinance,
the Quartermaster Division, the Corps of Engineers, the Signal Corps, the Medical Department,
the Construction Division, the Air Service (which, while part of the signal corps, was large
enough during the war to have political weight), and the Chemical Warfare Service.10 In
addition, there was no system for determining priority between the bureaus and no system for
traffic management of raw materials entering manufacturing plants or finished products

7

David Johnson “From Frontier Constabulary to Modern Army: The US Army Between the World Wars,” in The
Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941, ed. Harold Winton and David Mets
(Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 163.
8
Johnson, “Modern Army”, 164.
9
Johnson, 164.
10
Benedict Crowell & Rober Forrest Wilson, Demobilization: Our Industrial & Military Demobilization After the
Armistice 1918-1920, (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1921) 116.
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departing to the front. 11 Because of this, in the eighteen months that America participated in
World War I, not one American-made gun was made in sufficient quantity to supply the
American Expeditionary Force; America‟s allies in Europe were forced to provide nearly all of
the Americans‟ equipment. America‟s manufacturing capability was up to the task of producing
the needed materials, but because of a lack of coordination between bureaus, some key
components went unmanufactured, and others sat completed in warehouses but were not
transported to their final destinations.12 In fact, the number of 1903 Springfield rifles produced
before America‟s entry into the war was higher than the number produced after, when the war
department took over production regulation.13
In response to the problem of inefficiency, the army reorganized itself from a system of
departmental leadership to one where the various departments reported directly to the chief of
staff, under the leadership of the chief of staff, Gen. Peyton C. March. The chief of staff position,
originally created in 1903, had been growing slowly in power since that time and the efficiency
crisis in World War I resulted in the army putting each bureau under the chief of staff‟s direct
command. By replacing this bureau system with the chief of staff system, the army was able to
have top-down leadership in terms of weapons development, logistics, and general strategy. This
is opposed to having multiple bureau chiefs with the same level of authority fighting over
resources and pursuing their own interests independent of each other. While the bureaus still
existed, their chiefs all reported to the chief of staff and his general staff, who determined an
11

Peyton March, Report of the Chief of Staff, US Army, 1919, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1919), 15.
12
Johnson, “Modern Army,” 165.
13
“The American War Department,” The Colonist, Feb 2, 1918, 4.
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overarching strategy for all the bureaus.14 The efficiency of the army was greatly improved,
especially in terms of logistics.
Part of the army‟s expansion in the two decades prior to World War I included the
introduction of military aircraft. The practical application of flight was still less than fifteen years
old, and while aeronautical technology improved rapidly in that twenty years, the aircraft were
still quite primitive. At the time aircraft entered military service, they were made of wood and
canvas, and could not fly very far or fast. At the beginning of the first world war, airplanes were
used solely as reconnaissance tools, and air-to-air combat happened almost accidently, beginning
with one soldier using a rifle in the back seat of a scout, and ending the war with such ferocity
that the term “dog fighting” was used to describe it.15
The air corps as an independent branch did not exist in 1918. Instead, all army aircraft
were part of the army air service, which in turn was part of the army signal corps.16 The signal
corps was the army department tasked with establishing communications between units, as well
as reconnaissance and was not often directly involved with combat. Although aircraft at this time
were still primitive and were used mostly for reconnaissance, with some limited ability to fight
other aircraft or bomb ground targets, some within the air serive believed it had a much greater
potential.17

14

“Baker Divides General Staff into Five Bureaus,” New York Times, Feb. 11, 1918, 1.
“American Aviators in a Battle Royal,” New York Times, July 3, 1918, 1.
16
Bernard C. Nalty, Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force, Volume I, 1907-1950
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), 39.
17
Nalty, Winged Shield, 38-40.
15
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The United States Navy underwent an expansion very much like the army during the two
decades before to World War I. Prior to the Spanish-American War, the navy grew into a twoocean force connected by the Panama Canal and by the end of that war the American navy was
considered among the best in the world. Naval commanders began to envision the day that the
U.S. Navy would be on par with the British fleet.18
The outbreak of hostilities in Europe provided the justification for further expansion.19
President Wilson implemented a massive naval expansion program in 1916, and America‟s
involvement in the North Atlantic gave the navy valuable wartime experience.20 In addition, the
navy had long been planning for an offensive war with Japan and had devised a strategy called
War Plan ORANGE to deal with that potential conflict. This hypothetical plan was constantly
updated as new information and technology became available.21 The navy was, however, limited
by the same type of antiquated command system that hindered the army‟s efficiency before and
during World War I. During the war, this system caused a number of readiness and supply
problems, greatly affecting the navy‟s performance in the North Atlantic. At the end of the war,
the navy‟s commanders realized that they had a problem, and set out to fix it.22

18

“Plans to Make US First Naval Power: Secretary Meyer Reveals Programme for Building Greatest Battleships
World Has Seen,” New York Times, Feb. 27, 1910, 1.
19
The Great White Fleet was a 16 battleship fleet that circumnavigated the globe from 1907-1909 and was designed
to highlight America‟s new naval power.
20
“36,000-ton Ships Navy‟s 1916 Plan” New York Times, Nov. 19, 1915.
21
Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy,
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 245.
22
Tracy Kittredge, Naval Lessons of the Great War: A Review of the Senate Naval Investigation of the Critisisms by
Admiral Sims of the Policies and Methods of Josephus Daniels, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Pagel, and Co,
1921), 451.
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At the end of this period, the army overcame its inefficient command structure and
replaced it with a much more efficient system headed by the army chief of staff. The air service
still remained a part of the signal corps, and its full potential had not yet been realized. The navy,
in terms of numbers, was one of the most powerful navies in the world, but remained under the
control of the same bureau-style command structure the army had cast off. In the next three
chapters, however, the navy‟s numbers will be cut, but its efficiency and power will improve.
The air service will grow into a powerful and largely independent arm of the military. And the
army will fall and fail to develop key pieces of new technology.
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ARMY: BUDGETS AND BICKERING
Of the three branches of the military, the army was the least successful at the goal of
developing necessary military technology during the interwar period. The reason for this was
three-fold. First, the organizational structure of the army was inefficient, plagued with
overlapping goals, red tape, bickering, and a lack of a unified command structure. This problem
was greatly exacerbated by the funding problems that formed in the wake of World War I and
the rise of isolationist politics designed to keep America out of another European war. Of the
three branches, the army was the hardest hit by budget cuts due to its perception by Congress and
the general public as a solely “offensive” organization with no place in peacetime. The sparse
funds given to the already inefficient system created a perfect storm that would follow the army
well into the Second World War. This chapter will show that a combination of political,
budgetary, and organizational factors greatly hindered the army‟s ability to develop new
technology to keep pace with the rest of the world, and the technology it did develop was not
manufactured in sufficient numbers to allow it to be used effectively.
When Gen. March took over as chief of staff in 1918, he recognized the problems
inherent to an independent bureau system and set out to correct them. The Overman Act of May,
1918 gave him the authority to make sweeping changes to the army‟s structure and bureaucracy
for the duration of the war.23 His first step was reorganizing the goals of the existing bureaus to
eliminate any redundancy between them. Second, he created new bureaus to manage any duties
that the existing departments were not equipped or designed to handle. Finally, March
23

Johnson, “Modern Army,” 166.
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reorganized and expanded the army general staff to act as a manager for the bureaus in order to
direct their strategy as a cohesive unit.24 This reorganization, in the form of the Division of
Purchase, Storage, and Traffic, proved to be very effective and greatly increased the efficiency of
the army during World War I by putting the formation of army policy in the hands of one man,
the chief of staff, rather than having the bureau chiefs operate independently and without any
central plan or guidance.25 Because the chief of staff and his general staff had complete control
over the bureaus, they were able to rid themselves of the red tape, redundancy, and logistical
inefficiency that had plagued the previous system. For example, after Gen. March initiated his
reforms, the amount of supplies shipped to Europe in naval convoys increased by 100,000 tons a
month, production of Gillette razors increased seven-fold, and rifle manufacture reached over
30,000 per week.26

LESSONS LEARNED, LESSONS FORGOTTEN
The army learned many lessons from World War I. First, the necessity of general staff
control was made abundantly clear. The various bureaus needed a controlling force to focus their
efforts. Second, the advantages of having a stockpile of both clothing and equipment to supply
the army until the economy shifted to a war footing became evident. Third, the country needed a
larger standing army, especially with experienced officers. New troops and officers took too long
to train and more importantly, even longer to gain experience. March was an advocate of

24

March, Annual Report, 17.
Crowell, Demobilization, 116.
26
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universal conscription, believing that every man of age and ability should serve a term in the
army. In March‟s opinion, the size of the peace-time army would not differ greatly from a
wartime army. Fourth, the army would benefit from the organization of special services such as
the Tank Corps and Air Service, whose duties could not be duplicated by regular troops. Finally,
World War I crystallized the necessity of large-scale tactical training using a combination of
infantry, artillery, armored, and air units. This is related to the need for experience; the army
needed to be prepared to go to war at any time and could not rely on gaining experience under
fire alone.27 Unfortunately, most of these lessons would be forgotten early in the 1920s.
In 1921, the army underwent a major reorganization under the guidelines of the National
Defense Act of 1920. This act was one of many isolationist policies made in the wake of World
War I with a desire to “return to normalcy” and to stay out of European affairs. 28 The army‟s
size was limited to a peace-time maximum of 200,000 men (and would remain below 125,000
after 1922), the tank corps was abolished and tanks (and their crews) relegated to the infantry
department. The army‟s budget was set at $396,000,000, a billion dollars below its wartime
budget, and, after adjusting for inflation, only $100,000,000 higher than its 1914 budget.29 This
was in spite of a larger (by 40,000 men) standing army compared to 1914, and the new
requirements of armored and aerial warfare.30 In addition, the role of the chief of staff was
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marginalized as the bureau directors once again took control of army policy. 31 March‟s proposed
500,000-man army was rejected by Congress, both due to unpopularity of the plan among
civilians and because of his political enemies on Capitol Hill. March had been blunt with
Congress during the war regarding the need of an increased military presence at all times; the
unpopularity of this statement allowed his political enemies to gain traction in their fight against
him. He was accused of wanting to maintain a high troop count only because his fellow officers
wanted to maintain their wartime brevet (temporary) ranks. The final nail in the coffin was when
Representative John Miller of Washington asked what enemies the United States had to justify
such a large army. March was unable to answer satisfactorily, essentially implying that because
the army had the resources to train that many, it would be a shame to not do so.32 Gen. John
Pershing, hero of the American Expeditionary Force in World War I, helped to hammer in that
final nail when he stated that the maximum amount of soldiers for a peace-time army should be
no more than 300,000.33 In March‟s final Annual Report, he wrote that should the army drop
below 200,000 men, it would simply not be able to perform all the tasks relegated to it, and listed
the non-combative requirements of each department; of the 200,000 allotted men, 150,000 were
largely non-combat positions. Therefore, a 200,000-man army would only have 50,000 combat
troops.34 March retired in 1921; he was succeeded by the same Gen. Pershing who had
denounced him.
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The return to the bureau system was for reasons both fiscal and ideological. The US
government had just spent trillions of dollars on the war effort. In addition to this spending, the
government was still locked into billions of dollars of wartime contracts. If these contracts had
been immediately cancelled, it would have meant a complete collapse of an economy still
entirely on a war footing. Therefore, money had to be saved somewhere. Research and
development programs were slashed, as was the size of the armed forces. An army of over
2,000,000 soldiers in 1918 had been cut to 280,000 by 1920 and to 125,000 by 1922.35
Ideologically, the bureau system was seen as more democratic, “American” and capitalist. The
army was to be run like a corporation, with each bureau chief acting as a member of a board of
directors for the army.36 This reaction makes sense if the Communist Revolution in Russia and
the resulting Red Scare in the United States is considered.
The marginalization of the position of chief of staff and the return of the bureau heads to
power essentially returned the army‟s command structure to the status quo ante. Although the
chief of staff position still existed and his general staff still advised the various bureaus, they no
longer had direct control, allowing the bureau commanders to regain their control over their
departments. In addition, the board of directors mentality never materialized and the bureau
chiefs concentrated only on their respective departments. This left the army with the same
command issues it had experienced before and during the war, with the additional problem of
implementing a program of mechanization and modernization.
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The invention of the tank and the use of mechanized transportation had greatly changed
how battles were fought by increasing the speed of armed conflicts at both tactical and strategic
levels; each bureau would have to find a way to approach this new reality. Unfortunately, each
bureau only concentrated on its own specific area and gave little thought to a branch-wide
strategy; the infantry concentrated on the infantry, cavalry on cavalry, and artillery on artillery,
with very little thought for the integration of tactics. Under a strong chief of staff, the army may
have been able to focus on these issues as a cohesive unit as they had done in the latter stages of
World War I, rather than focusing on them individually. Even worse, the army had started the
war with eight different bureaus. After the National Defense Act, it had seventeen, adding to the
inefficiency of the system. In addition, Congress was not willing to provide enough funding to
fill the 200,000 soldier cap set by the National Defense Act of 1920; funding was also not
appropriated for research and development purposes.37

ANIMALS OVER ENGINES, TROOPS OVER TANKS
Another problem was that, in many cases, the heads of the bureaus were unwilling to
admit that mechanization was necessary at all and remained proponents of an army powered
primarily by animals, not engines. This was especially true for the leaders of the cavalry and
artillery departments. The cavalry was struggling to justify its existence after World War I
proved the obsolescence of horses on the modern battlefield.38 Machine guns and vastly
improved artillery had made the classic cavalry charge suicidal, which left horse cavalry without
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a role on the modern battlefield. The artillery continued working on firing farther, faster, more
accurately, and with more damage, but was constrained by a lack of mechanization, making it
harder to move larger guns and shells. In addition, artillery had suffered a “period of diminishing
returns” in World War I. This means that, at a certain point, the amount of effective damage done
per shell fired started to go down, and therefore the monetary cost of a bombardment went up
exponentially.39 By 1922, all research into mechanized artillery had been halted and all
motorized artillery units had been deactivated.40
The Infantry was still considered the most important section of the army and did little to
further develop the tank. The Field Service Regulations of 1923 stated “the special mission of all
other arms are derived from their powers to contribute to the execution of the infantry mission”
and that “infantry is the essential arm of close combat.”41 Both the cavalry and the air service
were relegated solely for purposes of reconnaissance, and there was no mention of the two
working together toward these ends.
Tanks, which had been reassigned to the infantry in 1920, were largely laid by the
wayside in the years immediately following their reassignment. Tanks were effectively forced to
weigh less than 15 tons due to the Ordinance Department‟s unwillingness to modify pontoon
bridges to carry more weight (the 1917 Mark VIII Liberty tanks, for example, weighed in at 37
tons and could not use pontoon bridges).42 Instead of focusing on quickly developing new, light
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tanks, the army focused more on building armored cars for Mexican border patrol, which were
much cheaper and easier to design and construct.43 The cars were only “armored” in the most
liberal sense of the word. The Pontiac T1 and Cadillac T2, first built in 1928, were nothing more
than standard civilian vehicles stripped down to base components, with very light armor added
and a machine gun attached.44 These armored cars could not replace the need for tanks in
warfare, due to their inadequate armor and armament.
Tank design theory in the 1920s was split between two different approaches; a “light”
tank (or armored car) designed to cover and accompany an infantry charge and a “leading” heavy
tank designed to spearhead a large assault. These were two very different roles and would have
been performed best by two separate vehicles designed exclusively to perform them. The army‟s
Caliber Board, however, elected to design a medium tank able to use existing pontoon bridges
rather than design a heavy spearheading tank or a light infantry-support tank. The first medium
tank, the Medium A, was a vehicle that incorporated many design features that would continue in
American tanks for the next three decades. These developments included the twin-turret
arrangement, which placed a small machine-gun turret above the main gun turret. However, after
the Medium A was built, the infantry decided to concentrate instead on light tanks and armored
cars, leading to a decline in the „medium tank‟ design.45 The chief of the infantry did not support
tank design, believing that the infantryman still held the primary role in ground warfare, and
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actively censored subordinates who supported tank design; these subordinates included both
Dwight D. Eisenhower and George Patton, who used tanks to great effect in World War II.46
Despite a general reluctance against technological development due to both funding
shortages and the entrenchment of pre-world-war ideas and tactics among high-ranking officers,
some officers within the army did advocate for mechanization. In 1928, the general staff
conducted an extensive study under the command of Col. O.S. Eskridge, a member of the tank
section of the infantry department. The test was designed to study the potential of a mechanized
force and was essentially a hodgepodge of various trucks, tracked vehicles, artillery, and the few
modern tanks the army possessed. The test, summarized by Capt. John Christmas of the
automotive section of the Ordnance department, succeeded on many levels and highlighted
where improvements were needed. The hodgepodge of vehicles caused some problems, with the
mechanized column being forced to slow or stop to allow slower or broken vehicles to catch up.
However, the column still made a 75-mile “daily march,” meaning the mechanized column,
despite delays, was able to move about 75 miles a day, which is between three and five times
faster than a non-mechanized column. Christmas took several lessons from this test: that vehicle
uniformity was essential to keep columns moving efficiently, that aviation would be needed to
support an armored column due to the column‟s vulnerability from air attacks, and that a
mechanized force needed specially trained men to do the job properly.47 In addition, Christmas
proposed several tactical and strategic theories based on this test, many of which were very
similar to what would become the Blitzkrieg; using tanks to punch a hole through the enemy line,
46
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and bringing up infantry both in armored troop carriers and on foot to hold the position.48
Christmas concluded that the advantages of a mechanized force greatly outweighed the
disadvantages (high cost and terrain limitations).49
Despite these recommendations for and the benefits of a mechanized force, such a force
never developed outside the experimental regiment. Rather than develop a technologically
superior army, with an emphasis on tanks, the army elected to focus on the development of
armored cars. These armored cars were cheaper and faster than modern tanks, but had much less
armor and firepower. They would have been used primarily for defense along the Mexican
border; however, they were never deployed in large numbers. Interdepartmental bickering
between the infantry, cavalry, and ordinance departments hindered the armored car‟s
development up into the 1940s and the Second World War.50
The Christie convertible tanks were a prime example of the effects of the lack of
cooperation between departments.51 The 1928 Christie was a revolutionary design for its time,
able to drive at speeds up to 70 mph on wheels and 42.5 mph on tracks, which was twice as fast
as the model T1 that the army was using as its standard armored car. The infantry purchased a
total of eight of the tracked version and the cavalry bought four of the wheeled “combat car”
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version.52 These amounts did not come close to providing an adequate number of armored
vehicles for the army.
The bickering began in 1933 when the Ordinance Department developed an updated
version of the Christie. It was 4 tons heavier and much more powerful. However, it had some
problems because of the Ordinance Department‟s insistence that it be able to run with both
wheels and tracks, causing steering complications. In hindsight, the wheeled version should have
been abandoned due to the complication of creating a drive system capable of handling both
wheels or tracks and the limited utility of the wheeled version. However, the infantry demanded
a tracked version and the cavalry the faster wheeled version. Rather than either fixing the
problems or proceeding with only the tracked version, the project was abandoned completely in
the United States (although the Soviet Union purchased the design and made good use of it.)53
President Herbert Hoover‟s military policies during his administration (1929-1933)
further hindered the mechanization of the army and the development of tanks. Hoover wanted to
adopt a policy of „hemispheric defense,‟ which ran in line with the current isolationist
tendencies. He planned for a quick expansion of the military during war time, but during
peacetime to maintain only enough military power to defend the Western Hemisphere. He
advocated for the mechanization of the peacetime army, but he also advocated a 40 percent
expansion of the air corps and took the money to fund this expansion from the infantry and
artillery departments. The air corps received $3 million for new aircraft. The rest of the army
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could only allocate $626,000 to new construction, and split that money with maintenance costs
for the national guard and an increased troop ration.54 The resulting budget crisis for the rest of
the army was so critical that it lost the ability to adequately defend the Western Hemisphere, let
alone project force anywhere else. In addition, the higher air corps funding further strained the
already tense relationships between departments.55
Chief of staff Charles Summerall wrote in 1929 that the army was unprepared for a war
in the following areas: mobilization, aircraft, harbor defense, anti-aircraft, selective service, new
weaponry (both in R&D and production), rearmament, and intelligence on the activities of
foreign armies.56 In his final report as chief of staff made the following year, Summerall
unequivocally denounced the bureau system, stating that “the defect of divided authority, which
brought about great confusion during [World War 1], had been completely eliminated under a
system of General Staff control, when unity of authority and responsibility under the chief of
staff was fully achieved.”57

COMPONENTS ARE DEVELOPED AS TRAINING DRAGS
In 1930, Gen. Douglas MacArthur took over the position of chief of staff. At the time, the
army consisted of only 12,000 officers and 118,750 enlisted men, nearly 70,000 fewer than the
minimum stated by Gen. March nine years before. Like March, MacArthur restated that because
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certain administrative offices must be filled, the majority of the manpower shortages were felt by
the fighting elements, hindering both the efficiency of these units and their ability to defend the
nation. He wrote that, even by cutting “mobilization and administrative nuclei to the bone and
(reducing) foreign and coast defense garrisons to dangerously low figures,” the bare minimum
manpower for the army must be 14,000 officers and 165,000 enlisted.58
Unlike March and his immediate predecessor, Summerall, MacArthur supported the
bureau system, especially in the areas of research and development of mechanization and
motorization. He did advocate a “General Council” of bureau chiefs to help curtail overlap, but
this seems simply a rebranding of the ineffective board-of-directors organization of a decade
before.59 This raises the possibility that MacArthur either received his appointment to the chief
of staff position because of his political beliefs, or that he was pressured to support the system in
order not to make waves.
MacArthur did write in his chief of staff reports that the army had made steady progress
on a variety of technological fronts. However, the development and procurement of these
technologies had been severely handicapped by the lack of funding available to the army. In the
early 1930s, the army, aside from a small number of new tanks and armored cars, still largely
used equipment left over from World War I; much of this equipment was approaching
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“mechanical exhaustion.”60 Other World War I surplus equipment, while still usable, was
obsolete to the point that if an emergency arose, it could not be used effectively against an enemy
armed with modern equipment.61
At the time that Gen. MacArthur took over as chief of staff, the United States had several
hundred tanks remaining from World War I, but only twelve tanks that could be considered
modern (mostly Medium As and Christies) - only one of which was operational. New tanks were
capable of 40 mph on roads and 20 mph off-road (the 1917 Liberty tank, by comparison, reached
a top speed of 5mph under ideal conditions). However, it cost all of the army‟s available funds to
procure one working model.62 All of the new tanks were critically under-armed, having nothing
heavier than a .5-inch machine gun or a 1.5-inch cannon, which was not large enough to be
effective against other tanks63 The army‟s meager efforts to procure more technologically
advanced systems ignored the reality of advances being made in other parts of the world. The
army did, however, make significant strides in the 1930s in the area of internal mechanics.
Among these developments were air-cooled radial engines, better transmissions, improved
suspensions and shock absorbers, and more rugged treads. These developments would eventually
produce reliable and efficient vehicles and would pay large dividends in World War II. After the
interwar period, the army made use of these components to design a number of vehicles, such as
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the Sherman tank, but at this time, these components remained individual systems, not part of a
single, usable design.64
Artillery was in much the same position as the tank. The army still relied on the World
War I gun known as the “French 75mm.” This gun was not capable of maximum-range fire
without digging a hole to raise the barrel of the cannon to a 45-degree angle. The gun also had a
maximum traverse (or swivel) of six degrees, and could not be rapidly transported from one
place to another without being damaged by the stress of travel. Newer guns were capable of this
rapid movement, a ninety-degree traverse, and were able to fire at a 45-degree angle without
digging in. However, like tanks, the technology for artillery had been developed but was not
widely distributed due to lack of funding.65
Following this trend of creating designs, but not producing them in sufficient numbers,
the infantry had developed a new rifle, the M1. This rifle was capable of firing three times as fast
as the Springfield 1903 rifle used in World War I, with significantly less fatigue failure. The M1
weighed the same at the 1903 Springfield, which, along with the improved firing rate, made it
more favorable to the infantryman tasked with carrying and firing said rifle. At the end of
MacArthur‟s term as chief of staff in 1935, however, the army had only allocated funding to
procure eighty M1 rifles, enough to equip only a large platoon or small company.66
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MacArthur, in his 1934 chief of staff report, outlined a list of necessary steps to bring the
army to war readiness, which he considered essential to defend the country. These steps
consisted of:
1. Continuous development of military technology in order to have a qualitative edge
over an opponent.
2. Purchase of a sufficient amount of new designs in order to develop new tactical and
strategic doctrines to match new developments.
3. Replacement of old technology with new as the old wears out, as opposed to
replacing old parts with old surplus.
4. Determination of how many of the new models would be required in a war and the
ability to procure them during peacetime.
These steps were not met between MacArthur‟s report and the beginning of World War
II. Because the steps were not met, the army continued to languish in budget deficits and the
inability to procure proper modern equipment. As a result, much of the army was forced to train
with World War I equipment. Because they were using old technology, the soldiers were
constricted to using outdated World War I tactics.67 Without producing new weapons,
mechanized transport, tanks, and field artillery in large amounts, troops were unable to train with
the new technology to become familiar with how it worked. Just as importantly, officers were
unable to experiment with the new tactics and strategies the new technologies allowed.
Experimenting and training with new technology is just as important as designing it.
67
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The New Deal greatly changed the atmosphere of funding in all the military branches. In
an effort to create jobs, the federal government, under President Franklin Roosevelt, allocated
millions of dollars to each of the military branches for new construction and research. In 1934,
the army received a $10,000,000 stipend from the Public Works Administration (PWA) for
vehicle construction and an additional $6,000,000 for ammunition. Using this money, the army
was able to begin a procurement program, including 150 tanks and combat cars and 3,340 new
semi-automatic rifles, as well as smaller numbers of field artillery and anti-aircraft guns. The
army was also given permission to expand to 165,000 men. However, outside of the increased
number of enlisted men, this was a drop in the bucket in terms of the army‟s total needs, and
MacArthur objected strongly to the allotment of $238,000,000 to the navy. MacArthur objected
even more about the air corps, which received $45,000,000 from the PWA independent from the
rest of the army. MacArthur‟s objections went unheeded; however, because the air corps and
navy were seen as defensive entities, it was politically easier to grant them money to expand in
order to create jobs.68 Therefore, the army continued to be understaffed, underfunded, and
underequipped.

OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT AND OBSOLETE TACTICS
In 1935, Gen. Malin Craig took over as the army chief of staff. At this time the army
budget crisis had reached a point so critical that many soldiers were not being equipped with any
equipment at all, let alone modern equipment. This was partly due to the expansion of the army
to 165,000 men. New soldiers were coming in at a much faster rate than new materials, leading
68
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to a major procurement discrepancy.69 In addition to this problem, Congress cut the army‟s
budget by over $100 million between 1934 and 1935.70 Seeing that it was impossible within the
current financial and political atmosphere to properly equip the army with enough modern
equipment, Gen. Craig elected to go the opposite direction and implemented his Protective
Mobilization Plan.71 This plan called upon a 400,000-man force to be made up of both Regulars
and National Guard units, which at least came close to Gen. March‟s 1921 estimate of 500,000
men to maintain national security, and well above his minimum estimate of 200,000. However,
most of the 400,000 man force would be National Guard units, which are militia and do not have
the same level of training as regular soldiers.
To get the money to raise this size force, Gen. Craig froze all research projects and
reduced the amount of army money going to research to .8% of the total army budget, down
from approximately 5.6% during the previous decade. This led to soldiers being issued
equipment that was obsolete before it was built. New tanks, guns, and rifles never entered
production in significant numbers, but the plan at least gave each soldier a rifle.72 Gen. Craig was
also not a major proponent of tank warfare. After observing the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939)
and the Sino-Japanese War (officially 1937-1945, but with border skirmishes beginning in 1931),
he concluded that tanks would remain, as they had been in World War I, infantry support
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weapons.73 In addition, he believed that the wars proved that defense had regained the ground
lost to tanks at the end of World War I, and that a defensive mindset and strong infantry were the
keys to winning a war. This defensive, infantry-centric mindset led to the United States falling
even further behind other world powers in terms of tank development.74
When Gen. George Marshall took over as chief of staff in 1939, he inherited an army in
shambles. The regular army contained only 174,000 enlisted men scattered over 130 different
bases. The army had no men to commit to a field army should the need arise, with nearly all of
these 174,000 men committed to essential non-combat duties, or garrison duty in the Philippines.
The available budget for training amounted to less than five percent of the total army budget,
which Marshall described as “that of a third-rate power.”75 The army had been restricted to a
two-week training cycle every four years, of which only five days contained actual maneuvers
due to a lack of motor transport. This was unacceptable to Marshall, and he sought to change the
army structure once again.76
Even as late as 1939, when World War II had already begun in Europe, Marshall still
received resistance from department heads against modernization. Both Gen. Robert Danford
and Gen. John Herr, chiefs of the artillery and cavalry respectively, were proponents of animal
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power over mechanized power through their removal in 1942.77 In February 1939, Marshall, as
deputy chief of staff, had written to Congress about the most critical aspects of the army‟s needs:
replacing the 36-year-old Springfield rifle design with the M1 as the standard-issue rifle, modern
artillery, manufacturing and distribution of anti-air and antitank munitions to army units,
manufacturing ammunition reserves, and that Congress deem these matters as necessary for
National Defense, rather than further cutting an already shoestring budget.78 Fortunately for
Marshall, after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, Congress raised the army‟s budget by just
under $200 million, to $513,188,782, independent of air corps allowances.
At the end of the interwar period, the army was in much the same position that it had
been in at the beginning. It was under-funded, under-strength, and under-trained. Most of its
units were still using outdated equipment from the First World War. Mechanization still needed
further development. The size of the army was still tens of thousands of men short of what the
chiefs of staff believed to be the minimum troop level to defend the country. The budget, while
slightly larger than it had been prior to World War I, was not enough to overcome the bureau
system‟s inefficiency and additional need to develop mechanization and motorization. In
addition, the budget problem only got worse during the mid-1930s, just as war began to appear
on the horizon. This dire situation severely affected the United States‟ ability to involve itself in
any armed conflict, especially a potential two-front war.
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The failures of the army to modernize cannot be laid at the feet of one institution or
event. The isolationist and defensive policies adopted in the early 1920s, especially the National
Defense Act of 1921, cut both the army‟s manpower and funding to the bone. In addition, the
marginalization of the position of chief of staff and the resurgence of the bureau system hindered
a cohesive effort towards modernization. Despite the support of mechanization by each of the
chiefs of staff, many of the bureau heads disagreed up until the beginning of World War II,
including the heads of both the artillery and cavalry departments as late as 1942. Despite this
resistance, in addition to a lack of funding, the army was still able to make progress, designing
modern and innovative components for tanks. These tanks, however, were also armed with
under-strength and obsolete weaponry. Although the army had designed the M1 rifle, fewer than
5,000 were made, and most of the army still used the 1903 Springfield rifle as a primary weapon.
The artillery department still relied on an antiquated design and cancelled its mechanized
artillery program completely. In addition, funding problems did not allow the army to produce
any new designs in significant numbers. This, coupled with the lack of funding for large-scale
training maneuvers, meant the army did not know how to make use of what little new equipment
it did have. In all, the interwar period can be considered an utter failure for the army. Fortunately
for the United States and its international military standing, other branches of the military did not
flounder as severely.
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AIR CORPS: FROM FABRIC TO FORTRESSES
The years between 1918 and 1926 were very difficult for the air service. The budget cuts
enacted by the National Defense Act of 1920 affected the air service even worse than the rest of
the army, and it rapidly found itself running out of both aircraft and men to fly them as the planes
crashed or broke down and pilots were killed or left the service. The government cancelled over
$100 million worth of production contracts for the air corps as soon as the war ended, and the
aircraft industry as a whole shrank to ten percent of its wartime size.79 The air service was cut to
9,000 men, down from nearly 200,000 officers and enlisted men at the end of World War I, and
could not produce any new aircraft. In 1924, the air service only had 800 active aircraft, and
many of these were obsolete DH-4s, which the British had begun replacing in 1914 for being
slow, underpowered and unreliable.80
In 1921, Gen. Pershing became the army chief of staff, and reorganized the air service
among the commanders of ground forces, making the chief of the air service a glorified
quartermaster with little in the way of actual authority.81 However, unlike the rest of the army,
army aviation succeeded in unifying its command structure and finding a role to fulfill in a
peacetime military. This, along with a mutually beneficial relationship with civilian aviation,
allowed the air corps to transform over the course of twenty years from a small, obsolete
reconnaissance auxiliary to a largely independent force of cutting-edge bombers.
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THE ERA OF BILLY MITCHELL
Despite its troubles in the early 1920s, the air service was not without its proponents. One
of the most outspoken proponents of the air service and air power during this period was the
deputy director of the air service, Gen. William “Billy” Mitchell. Mitchell had been in the army
since 1898 and had made several tours of the Pacific Rim, analyzing the defensibility of
America‟s Pacific holdings and observing the Russo-Japanese War. In 1916, he transferred to the
aviation section of the signal corps, which was the forerunner to the air service. In 1917, he was
sent to Europe as an aviation observer and spent the course of the World War I observing
military aircraft in France.82
Mitchell returned from the war with the realization that aircraft could become an essential
element to a modern military force. He was determined to form an independent air force in the
United States, on par with the army and navy in terms of importance within the military.83 He
saw that the new isolationist policies being enacted by the government would lead to a focus on
defensive strategies over offensive, so he steered his tactics in that direction, specifically towards
coastal defense.84 This, incidentally, would lead to thirty years of competition between the navy
and the air service over the question of who would be in charge of coastal defense.85 Mitchell
had some success, but his plan for an independent air force hit a solid wall of resistance with
both the heads of the army and the navy. Pershing insisted that the air service should remain an
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army auxiliary, while the navy had had its own air program for years and had no intention of
giving it up, as naval aviation needed to focus on different goals.86
Because he was unable to gain support for an independent air force in Congress due to
opposition from the army and navy, Mitchell turned to the public forum. He actively campaigned
against the navy in the press, claiming that the battleship was obsolete and could be easily sunk
by aircraft, which cost a fraction of what a battleship cost.87 In fact, Mitchell believed that the
navy was largely obsolete as a whole and that nearly all their missions could be performed and
exceeded by aircraft. He estimated that the cost of a naval battle group, consisting of a battleship
and its escorts, well exceeded $100,000,000. For this cost, he claimed an air force could build
4,000 aircraft, far more than would be needed to sink that battle group. At the time, the fleet
contained 18 battleships, each of which needed its own escorts; consequently, Mitchell estimated
that 72,000 aircraft could have been built for the same price.88 Mitchell argued that an air force
of that size would be able to defend the coast and control sea communications by locating and
attacking any enemy navy long before their battleship‟s guns could reach the coast. By early
1921, his public attacks on the navy had gained enough public support for Congress to force the
navy to allow a test of Mitchell‟s theories, especially his claim to be able to sink a battleship with
only a small number of aircraft.89
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On July 21, 1921, Mitchell‟s aircraft concluded a demonstration of their potential by
successfully sinking an old German battleship, the Ostfriesland, although they violated many of
the test parameters to do it, including altitude limits, bomb size, and attack patterns.90 The navy
protested that because of these violations the test was not conclusive. Nevertheless, the battleship
was at the bottom of the harbor, and that was all that mattered in public opinion. Mitchell was
openly contemptuous of the navy in his report on the test, mocking the sailors‟ panicked
responses to debris from bomb detonations landing on their ships‟ decks. Ironically, despite his
success in sinking all the targets in dramatic fashion, the test ended up being a set-back for
Mitchell‟s plan for an independent air force, because it solidified the navy against Mitchell
personally and induced it to pursue its own aviation techniques.91
In 1923, Mitchell continued his campaign to convince the military and government of the
need for an independent air force. Using eighteen bombers, he provided a small-scale
demonstration showing that an air force, using concentrated bases, could be used to defend any
point in America, especially the sparsely populated center.92 This defense would require a
concentration of force that was in conflict with Gen. Pershing‟s strategy of even distribution of
aircraft amongst the army‟s ground units. It was Mitchell‟s opinion that small amounts of aircraft
stationed with ground forces would not be able to project a unified force against an enemy,
diminishing their offensive capabilities and allowing them to be defeated in detail.93 Toward the
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end of 1923, Mitchell departed on a grand Pacific tour to once again inspect the military‟s
positions and relative strength. He concluded that war with Japan was likely and edging toward
inevitable. However, he also concluded that the United States was no longer the dominant power
in the region, losing that claim to the Japanese. Mitchell spent the next year contributing to the
tactical and doctrinal growth of the air service. He wrote a manual for air bombardment and a
comprehensive Pacific air strategy to combat the Japanese. These two works were nearly a
decade before their time; the technology to put his theories into practice would not be developed
until the mid-1930s.94
In 1925, a confluence of events occurred that ended Mitchell‟s career. First, the military
and government ignored his plan for the Pacific theater. Second, the government decreed that the
army and navy would continue to maintain control over their own aviation and aviation strategy,
and that it would not create an overarching Department of Defense to oversee the army, navy and
Mitchell‟s proposed air force. Mitchell was so frustrated by these decisions that when the navy
dirigible Shenandoah crashed on September 3, 1925, killing 17 men, he lashed out against the
government, accusing them of “incompetency, criminal negligence, and almost treasonable
administration of National Defense.”95 This gave President Coolidge, who already wanted
Mitchell out of the army, the ammunition he needed to court-martial Mitchell.
By this time, Mitchell had made enemies of President Coolidge and Secretary of War
Dwight Davis for his criticism of their handling of America‟s air services. In addition to these
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power players, Mitchell‟s embarrassment of the navy and subsequent attempt to annex the navy‟s
air service caused the naval air chief, Adm. William Moffett to remark, “I wish he were in
hell.”96 The majority of Congress, the media, and the general populace supported Mitchell (there
were actually demonstrations of support for him when a rumor was circulated that he would be
hanged for treason); the army was split, but mostly wanted the whole issue to go away. But the
Executive Branch hated Mitchell from Coolidge on down.97 Coolidge took over the investigation
personally, and stacked the jury against Mitchell.98 He was convicted of breaking discipline and
sentenced to be suspended from the army for five years. Mitchell resigned from the army on
February 1, 1926, effectively ending his time as the driving force behind military aviation in the
United States.99

THE NACA AND THE FORMATION OF THE AIR CORPS
Although Billy Mitchell was one of the most vocal proponents for the importance of air
power, he was not the only individual or organization working toward the technological
advancement of the airplane. The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA),
founded in 1915, was established by the United States government to effectively coordinate
aeronautical research. Following the post-World War collapse of the air industry, the NACA
dramatically reorganized itself to suit the new budget reality. It adopted four principles to govern
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its existence: 1, that the military services would be responsible for all training and personnel
policies within their branch, as well as the engineering development of aircraft for their branch;
2, that the Post Office would be in charge of its own aviation; 3, that the NACA would retain its
duty to advise and organize aviation research; and 4, that an Air Navigation Board would be
established within the Department of Commerce. The last principle created an official
department to regulate and encourage civilian aviation, controlled military air power at the
government level, and provided a joint board for the leaders of various air departments to
meet.100
Continuing to trim the bureaucratic fat, in 1919, the NACA abolished sixteen of its
eighteen existing research subcommittees and replaced them with four new “technical”
committees, three of which would account for eighty-eight percent of the reports published by
the NACA over the remainder of its existence. 101 During this period, the NACA became less
strictly “advisory” and became more involved with the research itself. The research goals of the
NACA were fairly conservative in nature; they did not strive for great leaps forward, but rather
for gradual progress based on engineering rather than science.102 This means that building
models and physically testing them became more important than theory.
The NACA‟s process for accepting and researching a problem was fairly straightforward.
The appropriate NACA committee would receive a suggestion for research from either NACA
staff or an outside source, typically a government agency or the military. All military requests
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were automatically accepted, and all others were examined to see if they added fundamental
knowledge to the field of aeronautics. If they were approved, they were given research
authorization and forwarded to the NACA research lab in Langley, Virginia. This system
allowed for research to be reviewed from the beginning and periodically thereafter and greatly
increased research efficiency. One of the most successful developments to come out of the
NACA was a new engine cowling for aircraft engines that was developed within months of the
initial request. This led to the NACA winning its first Collier Trophy, an annual award for the
greatest achievement in aeronautics.103
The early 1920s also saw the emergence of metal aircraft and a decline of new wooden
designs. Initially, the shift from wood to metal was primarily a marketing decision, not a material
one. Metal at the time had no inherent superiority as an aircraft building material. It was much
heavier, especially in the wing area. It was more expensive than wood, and wood actually had a
stronger tensile strength than metal.104 However, the public ideology of progress through
technology made metal a more popular choice as a building material. Wood was seen as an
impermanent, imprecise, and unreliable pre-industrial material, while metal was seen as a
permanent, efficient, and fire safe post-industrial material. Despite evidence discounting this
perception and the fact that airplane fuel and not the wooden design was the main danger, metal
designs rapidly won support from the military and the NACA. This shift from wood designs to
metal also denoted a shift in engineering from an art to more of a science. The metal designs
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encouraged research, and metals had more overall potential than wood, despite the fact that
wooden designs could outperform metal designs at the time. Metal designs also lent themselves
to mass-production techniques, whereas wood designs had to be built largely by hand by skilled
workers.105 In addition, the army feared that wood could not be produced in sufficient quantity
during wartime to build the number of planes they would need. Without any real data to support
it, they assumed that metal could be produced in sufficient quantity.106
Nearly a decade passed before any usable metal prototypes were developed for the air
service. Weight, performance, and cost were all significant problems for metal designs, which
led the air service to delay producing all-metal aircraft, although they still supported an all-metal
ideology. There was some success with metal wing spars due to metal‟s higher compressive
strength, but the air service would not produce any functional all-metal designs until the mid1930s, made possible by a number of congressional acts designed to strengthened the aeronautics
industry.
Between 1923 and 1926 a series of several congressional boards and acts dramatically
changed the course of both military and civilian aircraft in the United States. In 1923, in response
to Mitchell‟s bombing tests, the Lassiter Board was convened to review the state of the air
service and the civilian air industry. The air industry had lost millions of dollars in construction
contracts when World War I ended, and civilian buyers could buy wartime surplus aircraft rather
than purchase new planes from manufactures. What the Lassiter Board found was not inspiring.
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The Board reported on personnel shortfalls and aircraft deterioration. In addition, they found that
the lack of military contracts was causing a significant hardship for the civilian air industry. In
1924, the Board actually suggested the formation of an independent air force, or at least a
General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Corps, which would give the air corps a level of autonomy
within the army similar to what the Marines had within the navy. They also wrote that this air
corps (or air force) should be capable of both bombing and anti-air missions.107 The Morrow
Board was convened soon afterward, and was much more influential though much more
conservative, but it agreed with the Lassiter Board that the aircraft industry and the air service
were in disrepair and needed to be strengthened.108
The civilian air sector reeled in the aftermath of World War I. Cancelled contracts and
war surplus materials nearly dealt a death blow to the fledgling industry. This hurt military
aircraft design as well, as military aviation had always relied on civilian air industry for both
research and construction. By the mid-1920s, the industry was in danger of total collapse. In
February 1925, civilian aviation got its first governmental boost with the passing of the Kelly
Act. This act allowed the US Postal Service to contract out its air mail to private corporations,
rather than being restricted to government aircraft. This allowed private corporations to begin
building, selling, and buying new aircraft and new aircraft designs in order to gain government
contracts. In addition, the Kelly Act inadvertently helped to bring about the creation of air travel
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for civilians, as the mail rarely filled the aircrafts‟ cargo capacity and the remaining space was
often given over to a few passengers.109
To continue its aid to civilian aviation, Congress passed the Air Commerce Act in 1926,
which would permanently link civilian aircraft firms and military aircraft. This act approved new
manufacturing contracts for civilian companies to design and build aircraft for the military. It
ultimately led to a philosophy that military contracts were the best way to receive funding for
research and development. This act, along with the Kelly Act, greatly increased the health of
civilian aviation, which in turn proved very important to military aviation in the coming years, as
civilian aviation became a hotbed of technical innovation. Several transport planes were
modified to become bombers, and several bomber designs became transport and passenger
aircraft.110
The Air Corps Act was also passed in 1926. This act officially created the army air corps,
moving army aviation out from under the Signal Corps. This made sense from an organizational
standpoint because the Signal Corps was responsible for army communications and
reconnaissance, not combat. The creation of a separate corps for aviation gave army airmen a
level of autonomy from the rest of the army and allowed them to pursue their own goals and
methods. The act also increased the number of officers in the air corps from 900 to 1,514,
increased enlisted men from 9,760 to 16,000 and mandated that the air corps must have 1,800
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functioning aircraft at all times. The air corps chief of staff also reported directly to its own
Assistant Secretary of War.111
Maj. Gen. Mason Patrick, who had been chief of the air service since 1921, was made
chief of the air corps and did a great deal to create a culture separate from the army within the
corps. The air corps became an extremely closed society. Having grown weary of bringing in
senior officers from other divisions during his time in the air section and air service, Patrick
made more of an effort to promote from within. He mandated that ninety percent of each officer
grade within the corps must be certified pilots. Finally, with the founding of the air corps coming
closely on the heels of what was considered by many air corps officers to be Gen. Mitchell‟s
“martyrdom,” the internal culture of the air corps became one heavily in favor of complete
independence from the army; to think otherwise within the air corps quickly became career
suicide.112

FINDING A PURPOSE
After gaining partial independence from the army, the new air corps focused on carving
out a strategic niche for itself. The goal was to develop a role for the air corps that could not be
replicated by another branch of the military in order to gain funding. This niche became strategic
bombing. During World War I, the goal of the air service had been to support the infantry by
strafing trenches and providing reconnaissance. The air corps wanted to depart from this role,
and thus began to develop long-range bombers designed to attack enemies far behind the front
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lines in order to target cities and economic infrastructure rather than pure military targets. The air
corps classified long-range bombers as defensive weapons, although they were clearly
offensive.113 They were able to justify this because of the air corps‟ other focus, coastal defense.
The air corps justified these long-range bombers as being able to attack incoming ships, even if
they were also intended to attack cities.114
The late 1920s heralded a minor revolution in the American aircraft industry, both for
civilian and military aviation. Between 1928 and 1929, the total number of civilian air
passengers surged by 335 percent and doubled again between 1929 and 1930. Between 1927 and
1933, the amount of miles flown by non-airmail aircraft increased from 638,000 miles to
10,860,000 miles.115 This is an example of “Increasing Returns to Adoption,” a technological
concept which states that the more people who adopt a technology, the better and cheaper the
technology gets. Commercial aircraft, not burdened by limited federal funding and isolationist
policies (as the military was), actually leapt ahead of the military in the late 1920s into the early
1930s. In fact, by 1933, private airplane manufacturers had developed the basic commercial
design that would last into the 1970s.116
During this period, the air corps relied nearly entirely on private contractors for new
designs, doing virtually no internal research.117 Most of the planes built in the late 1920s were
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old-style wood-and-cloth observation planes, and were still using Liberty engines built during
World War I. These engines were “unreliable, inefficient, and uneconomical” and could not be
used in newer, heavier aircraft.118 In 1929, the air corps decided to promote all-metal designs
exclusively rather than wood or wood-metal hybrid designs. Funding problems caused by trying
to fund new aircraft while simultaneously expanding using existing designs kept the air corps
from reaching this goal right away, but it did purchase two all-metal designs in the early 1930s:
the Boeing YB-9 bomber, and the P-26 pursuit plane.119
The YB-9 was an example of civilian designs spilling over into military aviation. It was
the first all-metal bomber ever purchased by the air corps.120 The two-engine YB-9 was based
heavily on the Boeing Model 200 Monomail single-engine cargo plane. The Monomail was, in
turn, based upon the reports put out by the army and air corps regarding stressed-skinned wing
design, internally braced wings, and Warren-truss rib design.121 The only major differences
between the Monomail and the YB-9 were the addition of a second engine, a change of engine
location, and the purpose of the aircraft.122 Only a few YB-9s were ever actually produced for the
military, and the Boeing design eventually lost military bids to the Martin B-10. The B-10 was
originally designed with a metal frame and cloth-covered wings, but entered production with
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metal wings similar to that of the YB-9. The redesigned B-10 was slightly faster and had a higher
lift-to-weight ratio, meaning it was able to carry heavier loads given its size. The B-10 was the
first bomber with enough range and payload capacity produced in sufficient numbers (103 were
ordered) to really make the goal of strategic bombing possible.123
Despite their bomber design not being purchased in large numbers, Boeing did win the
contract to develop the P-26 in 1931 largely due to the initial success of the YB-9. The P-26 was
the first all-metal single-wing airplane to be built in the same price range of a wooden biplane
designed to play the same role. The P-26 performed significantly better than its wooden biplane
predecessor, the Boeing P-12C. In addition, the P-26 actually cost less to build than the P-12C
when it went into production in 1933; when the deflation caused by the Depression is factored in,
the P-26 cost slightly more in materials, but still less in construction.124

THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND GROWING AUTONOMY
The Great Depression did not affect the air corps as much as it did the rest of the country
or the other branches of the military. As seen above, many of the major advances in metal
designs occurred during the first few years of the Great Depression, between 1929 and 1933. In
1931, Trubee Davison, the Assistant Secretary of War in charge of the air corps, reported that in
terms of aircraft strength, the United States ranked fourth in the world including naval aircraft,
and ranked fifth without them. He found this unacceptable and called for a substantial expansion
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of the air corps.125 In 1933, chief of staff MacArthur rejected a proposal to greatly expand the air
corps beyond budgetary possibility, but did direct the deputy chief of staff, Gen. Hugh Drum, to
convene a committee to review the air corps‟ expansion plans. The Drum Board also rejected the
proposal, but did suggest the formulation of a General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Corps which
would, if created, grant army aviation even more independence, similar to that of the marines in
the navy. It would also allow the air corps to train and develop tactics independent of the army.
The Drum Board was the first committee to suggest the creation of a GHQ for the air corps since
the Lassiter Board in 1923.126 The Drum Board also suggested a more realistic but substantial
increase in the number of aircraft. However, these suggestions were not immediately acted upon
due to the army‟s budget crisis.127
In 1934, the air corps and navy once again made a push for sole control of coastal
defense. This led to a prolonged battle between Gen. MacArthur and the new navy chief of
operations, Adm. William Standley. After months of talks and government intervention, they
reached a compromise that was purposely vague and let both branches continue to claim
responsibility over coastal defense.128 The outcome of this ambiguous settlement was that the
army had no choice but to grant the air corps more autonomy. It allowed the creation of a
peacetime GHQ Air Corps in order to organize, deploy, and train the air corps as if war could
begin at any moment, since it would be its responsibility (in the army‟s eyes, if not the navy‟s) to
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defend against a surprise attack upon the coastline. This also led to the long overdue cancellation
of the Pershing-designed 9-element strike forces under the command of ground commanders.
Instead, the GHQ Air Corps put the entirety of the air corps under the singular command of the
chief of the air corps, second only to the army chief of staff.129
Before the GHQ could be organized, a crisis greatly stressed the air corps and hastened
its formation. In early 1934, President Roosevelt cancelled the air mail contracts between the
Post Office and the independent contractors licensed to deliver the mail, thanks to a Senate
committee‟s findings of collusion and fraud on the part of the contractors. Roosevelt asked air
corps chief of staff Benjamin Foulois if the air corps could temporarily handle the load. Foulois
agreed without considering the implications of the task. It turned out to be an unmitigated
disaster. Air corps pilots were not used to flying through harsh weather or at night; delivering the
air mail required both of these things. Instruments such as artificial horizons, gyro compasses,
and radios, although developed, were not in sufficient supply, so many of the pilots had to do
without. In the twelve months the air corps handled the mail, there were twelve deaths, sixty-six
crashes, and only a sixty-six percent completed delivery rate. Each of these deaths and crashes
was also highly publicized, creating a perception that the air corps was incompetent.130
The disaster of the air mail project did result in some good. The use of instruments and
instrumental flying became standard practice within the air corps. The use of radio
communications while flying also proved to be important, and the air corps created a national air
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communication system, which would be officially established as the Army Airways
Communication System in 1938. Also, the negative press of the disastrous airmail project was
mitigated somewhat by the public, who could not believe that the air corps could have failed so
miserably on its own; they called for the government to improve its funding and training.131
The government‟s response was to convene the 1935 Baker Board under Newton Baker,
former Secretary of War. The Baker Board suggested much the same things as the earlier Drum
Board, and expanded the air corps to 2,320 aircraft and 16,650 men. It also expedited the
formation of the GHQ Air Corps, which, while approved, had not yet completed organizing. The
Baker Report reiterated that a civilian aviation industry was “absolutely essential to the national
defense.”132 This was not only for research purposes, but also because “military aviation in time
of war must rely upon airplanes built in time of war and consequently the general condition and
productive capacity of the aircraft industry are of national concern.”133 That same year the air
corps received $45,000,000 from the Public Works Authority for new construction and
research.134 The air corps also received over $48 million independent of the army and an
additional $22 million solely for aircraft purchase. It should be noted this was the same year that
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the army‟s budget was cut by $100 million.135 This clearly shows the government‟s commitment
to military aviation.
The leadership of the air corps, after failing to gain complete independence despite
support from both the Drum and Baker Boards, realized that the GHQ Air Corps was the closest
it could reasonably come to independence for the time being. The GHQ Air Corps was officially
activated in March 1935, ending the push for an air force until after World War II.136

THE RISE OF CIVILIAN AVIATION FIRMS
The NACA did not enjoy the same success as the air corps during the Depression years.
In the wake of the stock market crash, it was accused, but never convicted, of corruption and
profiteering. As a result of these accusations, the agency reorganized, focusing more on internal
research rather than their initial advisory role. It combined some redundant research
subcommittees in order to conserve funds and improve its public image. Despite its efforts, the
NACA received no congressional funding from 1931-1937, although funds appropriated by the
New Deal‟s Public Works funds would alleviate some of this budget shortfall.137
The NACA was called upon to justify its existence constantly throughout the 1930s.
Because the NACA had moved away from advising and organizing and had focused on research,
it seemed to be redundant when compared to the plethora of both civilian and governmental
research firms and agencies focused on the advancement of air power. The NACA denied that it
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had deviated from its purpose to advise and organize research; it responded by saying that, unlike
civilian firms or individual military services, the NACA provided a forum for other research
groups to discuss what they were doing, and therefore it actually prevented duplication of
research. However, this distinction was often overlooked by congressmen and citizens, and in the
public mind, the seeds of doubt had been sown. By the end of the 1930s, the NACA had lost its
claim to being the being the best avionics research lab in the world. Domestic firms had taken the
lead, as had other European firms. Despite the growing crisis in Europe, the NACA could not
consistently overcome its enemies in Congress and by the end of the interwar period, the NACA
had lost much of its relevancy as an avionics research organization.138
Civilian industry and academia took over much of the research from the flagging NACA.
Much of the growth in these two sectors can be attributed to Daniel Guggenheim, a wealthy
industrialist and philanthropist. Between 1926 and 1930, Guggenheim donated over two million
dollars to various universities in order to establish and expand aeronautical engineering
schools.139 In 1926, Guggenheim founded the Daniel Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of
Aeronautics. This fund was an outgrowth of his already sizable contributions to New York
University and focused on building aerospace programs in all areas of the country. The first
universities selected were from the West and Midwest: the California Institution of Technology,
Stanford University, and the University of Michigan. These universities already had small
aeronautical schools with influential aircraft engineers. Guggenheim donated between $300,000
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and $500,000 to each school to greatly expand their programs.140 Having donated money to
universities on the West coast (Stanford and Cal Tech), the Midwest (Michigan) and New York
(NYU), Guggenheim donated money to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in December
of 1926 and the University of Washington in 1928 in order to establish aeronautical schools in
New England and the Pacific Northwest respectively.141 The final school to be selected was the
Georgia School of Technology (later the Georgia Institute of Technology) in 1930. Georgia Tech
was the only school without an established aeronautical school, but its location and state funding
made it the best choice for a Southern Guggenheim school.142 In just over four years, Daniel
Guggenheim had altered the landscape of aeronautics in academia. In 1926, there were only 96
aeronautical engineering students in the country, most of them enrolled at the first four
Guggenheim schools. In 1930, when the fund expired, there were hundreds of students scattered
across the country. In addition, the funds provided helped to build wind-tunnels at each of these
schools, an essential piece of equipment for an aeronautics lab.143 These schools remain some of
the best aeronautical schools in the country; the top six aerospace engineering graduate schools
in the country began as part of the Guggenheim Fund.144
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In addition to his contributions through the Guggenheim Fund, Daniel Guggenheim also
made contributions to public grade schools to start aeronautical classes.145 He gave grants to
graduate students to travel abroad and to conduct independent research.146He gave numerous
grants to fund the development of more accurate flying instruments. These instruments allowed
pilots to “blind fly,” meaning flying only using instruments in bad weather or at night.147 Finally,
he founded the “Safe Aircraft Competition.”148 Most airplane crashes at the time were caused by
engines stalling at slow speeds and at low altitudes, which meant they usually stalled while
trying to land. The Safe Aircraft Competition awarded $100,000 to the first aircraft designer to
build an aircraft meeting the following specifications: the plane must land at less than 30mph on
a less than 100-foot runway and must fly level at 35mph. In addition, the aircraft must reach a
top speed of at least 110mph, climb at 400 feet-per-second, and have enough inherent stability to
allow the pilot to take his hands off the controls for a full five minutes while travelling between
45mph and 100mph. Finally, extra points were given to any contestant who could outperform
these specifications.149 The results of this competition led to a revolution in landing safety by
producing more stable avionics and technology that allowed aircraft to fly at slower speeds. An
unexpected additional result was that the same technology that made landing safer also
drastically shortened the distance an aircraft needed to take off. This would eventually lead to a
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type of wartime aircraft known at the Short-Takeoff-and-Landing (or STOL) aircraft. The ability
to use very short runways made these aircraft useful in island landings and on city streets.150
Advances made by Guggenheim school graduates led to several major advances in longrange strategic bombing in the 1930s. In 1934, following the success of the YB-9 and B-10, the
air corps set a contract reward for “Project A,” a proposed bomber that would carry 2,000 pounds
of bombs 5,000 miles at 200 mph.151 The contract was awarded to Boeing later that year. Project
A was designed as a long-term experimental design and was not meant to be a design-and-buy
project.152 While the first product of Project A, the XB-15 (X for experimental), was an
operational failure (it could only fly 145 miles per hour fully loaded and barely travelled at 200
mph empty) it did contain a number of highly advanced systems. These systems included an
autopilot, deicing installations (essential for a high-altitude bomber), fire-fighting equipment,
electric generators, and passages within the wings that allowed for engine maintenance during
flight.153 In addition, because of the length of the flights it was designed to achieve, the XB-15
contained sleeping, toilet, and cooking facilities, as well as space for an onboard flight engineer.
It could also carry 8,000 pounds of bombs--four times the amount of payload Project A required.
Although the XB-15 was a technical “failure” in that it did not get built in large numbers, the
plane did serve as a Red Cross cargo plane, and gave Boeing the experience needed to create a
much more successful design: the B-17.154 Project A was finally cancelled in 1945 and was a
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valuable experiment in terms of technological development, contributing heavily to the design of
heavy bombers. In addition, the long-term project did much to cement the relationship between
the air corps and civilian designers.
The bomber project that would lead to the B-17 actually began about the same time as
Project A, and was designed to replace the B-10. The air corps did some fast talking to convince
Congress to fund both Project A and another long-range bomber design simultaneously, but
disguised the similarity by pitching Project A as a design for a bomber with long range, and
phrasing the other project as a bomber with better speed and efficiency. Realistically, both of
these amounted to a fast long-range bomber, but the B-10 replacement needed to be built as soon
as possible, while Project A was a long-term project not designed to produce quick results. The
distinction between range and efficiency was enough to gain funding for both projects. Boeing‟s
experience with Project A gave it the advantage on the project by allowing them an inside look at
what the air corps actually wanted, aside from the vague official description, which boiled down
to “like the B-10, but better.”155
The resulting XB-17 was a paragon of engineering when it entered the design phase and
the interwar highpoint of the air corps drive to develop strategic bombing. It was streamlined,
with all external systems either removed or integrated into the hull. All its weapons systems were
enclosed, including machine guns and bomb racks. The plane also had retractable landing gear.
The main body and wings were designed to distribute weight and stress evenly across the length
of the plane, rather than on reinforced stress points. Redundant electric generators used to power
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major systems, such as landing gear, bomb bay doors, and flaps, were spaced widely throughout
the plane‟s fuselage and wings.156 These design points made the B-17 extremely survivable in
combat because it could take massive damage without tearing itself apart due to structural
damage or losing systems due to power failure.157 Numerous stories came out of World War II
about B-17s remaining aloft and landing safely after sustaining major damage to the wings,
fuselage, and tail. The popular joke was to just grab onto the biggest piece, and it would get you
home.158
Although the reports coming out of Boeing headquarters convinced several air corps
officers that the B-17 was the winner before it was ever built, other aviation companies were not
willing to concede the contract. The Martin Company submitted a design that was essentially an
improved B-10, with upgraded landing gear, autopilot, flaps, and radio equipment. Douglas also
submitted a “bomberized” version of its DC-2 cargo plane, named the B-18 “Bolo.”159
The B-17 was the clear favorite among the air corps‟ airmen due to its longer range and
heavier payload, but it did have one major flaw: its cost. The B-17 was a giant aircraft for its
time, and cost twice as much as the smaller B-18. The War Department and army chief of staff
Craig were committed to providing the air corps with a certain amount of bombers, but felt they
could fulfill that pledge for half the cost if they purchased the less-popular B-18. This also
coincided with the government‟s isolationist policies; the range and payload capacity of the B-17
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made it hard to fit into the official policy of “bombers for coastal defense” as it was clearly an
offensive plane. With a range of over 2,000 miles, a B-17 could strike targets halfway across the
Atlantic, which at the time was too far away to hit a moving target. In addition, B-17s optimal
flight altitude was 7,000 feet, too high for an accurate strike against something as small as a
battleship for aircraft carrier. When one of the XB-17 prototypes crashed due to pilot error in
1935, it gave the War Department the excuse it needed to buy 350 B-18 Bolos, and only thirteen
B-17s. Airmen disliked the B-18, describing it as having a “strong affection for the ground.”160
The B-18 had a short and uneventful career and, with the growing threat of war, was being
phased out of its bomber role by the early 1940s in favor of the B-17‟s stronger offensive
capability.161
The rapid progress made in strategic bombers in the mid-to-late 1930s did not carry over
to the fighter planes or pursuit aircraft. The P-26 was only slightly faster than the bombers it was
designed to escort or attack, and was unable to intercept “attacking” bombers in a number of
exercises. Several air corps officers, most notably Brig. Gen. Oscar Westover, assistant chief of
the air corps, suggested removing pursuit aircraft from the air corps completely due to lack of
performance. He also believed that they were not needed for escort duty, stating that bombers
flying en masse in close formation would be able to successfully defend themselves from
attacking aircraft.162

160

Walter R. Close, “The B-18: a Reminiscence,” Aerospace Historian 19, no. 2 (summer, 1982): 92.
Moy, War Machines, 80.
162
Nalty, Winged Shield, 140-141.
161

62

Pursuit fighters did have some support, especially from Capt. Claire Chennault. He stated
that the P-26‟s inability to intercept its target bombers was caused more by the airplane‟s age in
relation to its targets rather than the inherent invulnerability of the bombers, which was the air
corps‟ official position. He also believed that the failure of the P-26 should inspire the air corps
to improve their fighter aircraft rather than assuming that bombers could provide their own
defense, and pointed to new foreign fighters as proof of the fighter aircraft‟s potential. Chennault
was considered largely an annoyance to the air corps commanders and although he did influence
the younger generation of fighter pilots, his beliefs would not become doctrine until World War
II began and the vulnerability of the bomber squadron was proved.163 At the end of the interwar
period, the air corps had three planes in development to replace the P-26, but all of them were
obsolete compared to their Japanese and German competition. The P-36 and P-40 were fast at
low-altitude, but lacked the power for high-altitude flight necessary to attack bombers. The P-38
had the power necessary to go head-to-head with the Japanese and Germans, and was one of the
better interceptors in World War II, but during this period it was plagued by mechanical
problems.164
In late 1938, President Roosevelt called a meeting that resulted in legislation that would
be known as the air corps‟ “Magna Carta.” In this meeting, he called for the expansion of the air
corps from 2,300 planes to 10,000, with the ability to purchase another 10,000 every year.
Roosevelt‟s goal was to be able to put teeth behind any letters he sent to foreign governments,
and because building an army was politically impossible due to the perception of the army as a
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solely offensive force, he would build an air force instead.165 In March of 1939, Congress
approved a budget of $358 million dollars for the air corps alone, a total larger than the army‟s
budget the previous year.166
Military air power in America underwent an amazing transformation during the interwar
period, going from a small collection of wood-and-fabric scouts to a fighting force of over 2000
all-metal aircraft capable of striking at an enemy over thousands of miles away. The organization
of that air power had undergone a transformation as well, growing from a part of the signal corps
to become a largely independent air corps, permitted to make many of its own policy decisions
and able to train and organize as it saw fit.
Despite their successes, however, the air corps still lacked an air-superiority fighter at the
end of the interwar period. Because of the overconfidence of the air corps‟ commanders,
especially Oscar Westover, fighters and pursuit aircraft did not develop as quickly as bombers
and lagged behind significantly. In addition, isolationist policies did hinder the air corps‟ ability
to produce large bombers in significant numbers until the last year of the interwar period, due to
the necessity of appearing defensive in nature to secure funding from the government.
The organization of the air corps played nearly as important a part to the advancement of
aviation technology as the various research groups determined to advance it. As a part of the
signal corps, airmen were expected to perform only scouting and infantry support missions, and
therefore did not have much need for large long-range aircraft. As a semi-independent
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organization, the air corps pursued research avenues that may have gone unsearched otherwise.
In addition, the air corps‟ interaction with civilian designers helped advance civil aviation as
well, which then returned dividends back to the air corps. Unlike the rest of the army, which was
hindered by isolationist policies and interdepartmental bickering, as well as funding shortages,
the air corps had a unified command structure and was able to make critical advances despite the
isolationist stance of the interwar period.
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NAVY: BATTLESHIPS AND BOMBADIERS
America‟s return to isolationist policies following World War I and the adoption of
international naval reduction treaty agreements almost immediately took their toll on the navy.
Despite these restrictions, the navy was able to emerge from the period between the world wars
with a comprehensive naval strategy and the technology to put that strategy into action. This era
saw the development of many technologies and organizations that would be essential in World
War II, such as purpose-built aircraft carriers, naval aviation, and radar. The navy managed this
by reviewing its actions during and before World War I, identifying what it had done wrong, and
learning to fix these problems, many of which mirrored the problems of the army. Following this
step, the navy created a philosophy of quality over quantity to overcome the tonnage limitations
imposed by the Washington Naval Treaty, and succeeded in developing in nearly every
technological area before the end of the interwar period.

THE FORMATION OF THE TREATY SYSTEM AND THE NAVY’S REACTION
Navy policy emerging from World War I was uncoordinated and essentially revolved
around a showdown between Adm. William Sims, known to be one of the major naval heroes of
the war and commander of all naval forces in Europe, and Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the
Navy. Sims had been rather outspoken in his contempt for Secretary Daniels during the war
(largely due to the navy‟s and merchant marine‟s losses from German U-boats), and in response,
Daniels launched a propaganda campaign against Sims in 1919. This culminated in Daniels
promoting a senior naval officer over Sims for the position of Chief of Naval Operations. Daniels
appointed Adm. Robert Coontz, who had no combat experience in the war and was junior to
66

Sims and several other wartime commanders.167 Sims returned fire, attempting to destroy
Daniels‟ reputation as a competent leader of the navy, and political factors made their rivalry a
central point of the 1920 Naval Affairs Committee, a congressional body designed to review
naval conduct during World War I.168 However, Sims‟s obvious hatred of Daniels colored his
testimony and allowed many senior officers in Washington to back Daniels, while Sims was
backed by junior captains. The final Senate report was split between Republicans and
Democrats, and nothing was really decided at the political level. Both parties were waiting for
the elections of 1920, with Democrats waiting for a new leader and Republicans waiting for their
turn to create a post-war policy.169
Within the navy, however, the Senate Naval Investigation bore fruit. The committee
analyzed the actions of the navy before and during World War I, and the problems it saw
mirrored those seen in the army: competing bureaus made the organization inefficient as a
whole, the navy lacked a consistent policy, and also lacked up-to-date war plans.170 In response
to these findings, the navy called for the following changes: the navy needed to develop a single
thinking and planning bureau; reorganization so that that all the bureaus were under the Chief of
Naval Operations; the need for a commitment to research and development; that the navy prepare
and organize for war at all times; and that the navy have a regular training schedule. In addition,
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all senior staff officers must be qualified for their spots based on merit, rather than gaining high
office for political reasons. As a result of these senate hearings, the navy avoided many of the
same problems that plagued the army, which contributed to greater success in technological
development.171
In the elections of 1920, Republicans emerged with the presidency and majorities in both
congressional houses. This Republican victory opened the door to the isolationist treaty system
that limited the navy‟s budget and numbers, and would affect naval policy for the next two
decades. Republican leaders restated America‟s unwillingness to involve itself in European
affairs, and subtly hinted at seeking a new balance of power in the Pacific Rim. European nations
had lost a great deal of power in the Pacific, and America found itself as one of the dominant
powers in the region, with the other being Japan. Initially the government planned to continue to
follow the wartime naval expansion program begun by the Big Navy Act of 1916 and the
Destroyer Act of 1917. The goal was to expand the navy to equal Britain‟s, which had 33
battleships and 9 battlecruisers to America‟s 16 battleships.172 As a result, the navy retained a
fairly high budget directly after the war: $396 million 1921, comparable to the army‟s despite
containing only half the manpower and substantially higher, even after inflation, compared to its
1915 budget.173 However, Senator William Borah of Idaho took the idea of International
Disarmament from the Versailles Treaty and proposed its application to America‟s armed forces.
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In 1921, he advised adopting international treaties to set the maximum tonnage for the fleets of
the Great Powers.
The British responded enthusiastically to the idea, and an international conference in
Washington D.C. was set for 1921 and concluded in 1922. The primary goal for the Washington
Naval Conference was to set limits to the total tonnage allowed for capital ships within the
nations participating in the conference.174 The current American naval war plans, under Plan
ORANGE, assumed an offensive war with Japan, and assumed that the navy would lose 10% of
its fighting ability for every 1,000 miles traveled in the open ocean. Using this ratio, the
Americans came to the conclusion that they would need ten battleships for every six the Japanese
had to retain a slight advantage, or a 10:6 ratio. The British demanded parity with the Americans,
leading to a 10:10:6 ratio for the Americans, British, and Japanese respectively, which was
simplified to the 5:5:3 agreement. In addition, the maximum size of a capital ship was set at
35,000 tons and could not have guns larger than 16-inches.175 All other classes had to weigh in
less than 10,000 tons and were limited to 8-inch guns.176
The signing nations believed that international competition would be minimized by this
ratio system and the treaty was seen as a major success because it both halted America‟s rapid
naval expansion and forced England to surrender her naval supremacy.177 A ten-year halt to
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battleship construction was included, prompting claims that the treaty sunk more battleships
“than all the admirals of all the world would have sunk in a cycle of centuries.”178 The treaty
limited the United States and Britain to 525,000 tons of battleships (or roughly 18 ships with a
maximum tonnage of 35,000 tons). As a result, the navy was forced to decommission fifteen
battleships and battlecruisers and effectively wasted over 300 million dollars.179 In 1922, the
navy scrapped 376 vessels or keels, including six battleships, 15 battlecruisers, one cruiser, eight
mine layers, twenty-five eagles (a type of patrol ship), two gunboats, and one hundred seventy
three destroyers.180 However, the treaty allowed for 135,000 tons for aircraft carriers independent
of the capital ship total. The naval budget also suffered greatly. In 1922, Congress cut the budget
by $100 million and reduced the size of the navy by 20,000 men.181
The main goal for the navy over the next two decades became finding a way to
circumvent the restrictions placed upon it by the Washington Naval Conference and subsequent
budget cuts. The navy, with its quantity limited, had to focus instead on quality, and to do that it
turned in large part to the development of technology, especially naval air power. In 1921, the
Navy Joint Board reported, “It has become imperative as a matter of national defense to provide
for the maximum possible development of aviation…in the navy,” and in 1922, the Naval
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Bureau of Aeronautics was established182 Over the next two decades, naval air power would go
from being a small cadre of pilots from World War I to a strategically relevant fighting force. 183

THE RISE OF THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER
With the moratorium on battleship construction, the navy began focusing its construction
on aircraft carriers. The first carriers built were essentially experimental modifications on
existing ships; the top of a ship was removed and a deck installed in its place. Initially, naval
aircraft made their mark by acting as spotters for battleship guns, and had enough success that
their opponents were silenced and further experimenting was allowed. The first carrier to enter
US service was the Langley, which was modified from the fleet supply ship (or collier) USS
Jupiter. This first carrier had a number of innovative designs, including two aircraft catapults.
However, it was only regarded as experimental and had a number of major design problems,
especially smoke dispersal, slow launch-time for aircraft, and a small total amount of embarked
aircraft. In addition, it was too slow to keep up with the older battleships, making it difficult for
its aircraft to fulfill their reconnaissance role. Its sister ships were eventually relegated as
“training carriers” to keep them out of the total tonnage allowable for carriers by the Washington
Naval Treaty; however, the Langley remained in active service as a carrier until 1937.184 The
first two purpose-built carriers, the Lexington and Saratoga entered service in 1927.185
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One of the major players in the development of early naval aviation came not from the
navy, but from the army. William “Billy” Mitchell was the major proponent of an independent
air force in the early 1920s, and this vision of an independent air force included all naval aviation
as well. Mitchell believed that aerial warfare had become just as important as naval and ground
warfare, and that to accomplish his goal of developing air power, all aircraft must be controlled
by a central authority. In 1919 and 1920, he unsuccessfully attempted to gain control over
aircraft carriers by classifying them as “air transports” rather than warships.186 Thwarted on this
front, Mitchell decided to prove that the battleship was obsolete and could be destroyed by
aircraft. He formally challenged the navy to allow him to prove this. Pressure from both the
general public and Congress forced the navy to perform the test in 1921. Mitchell did succeed in
sinking three test battleships, but violated most of the limits that the navy had imposed. The navy
complained about these violations and countered that a manned ship with anti-air and damage
control crews may have been able to save the targeted ships. However, the writing was on the
wall; Mitchell had succeeded in sinking the ships.187
The test did not succeed in the way Mitchell hoped, however. Rather than winning him
control over ship-based aircraft, it instead forced the navy to develop its own aircraft in order to
keep Mitchell out of their bailiwick. The navy organized its own Bureau of Aeronautics under
the leadership of Rear Adm. William Moffett, whose career would be both longer and more
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successful than Mitchell‟s. Most importantly, the navy was able to keep control over its aircraft
and aircraft carriers.188
Even more important to the foundation and advancement of naval aviation was Rear
Adm. William Moffett. Moffett took over the navy‟s newly created Bureau of Aeronautics in
1921. Moffett was a decorated sailor at the time, with over thirty years in the navy and a
Congressional Medal of Honor recipient. Prior to his appointment as the navy‟s head of aviation,
Moffett‟s career solely consisted of surface warfare, most of it on battleships. His history as a
battleship commander gave him credibility when he said that aviation must become a key
component of naval strategy.189 In a dramatically different approach to Mitchell, Moffett created
a philosophy within the naval aviation community of “naval officer first, pilot second.” This
contrasted greatly with Mitchell‟s push for an independent air wing, and contributed to the
reasons as to why naval aviation stayed part of the navy; the high commanders knew their pilots
were loyal.190 Moffett turned naval aviation into one of the best aviation programs in the world.
The navy flew its first all-metal aircraft in 1922 and commissioned all-metal designs by 1925.191
The navy also claimed the title of the first naval aviation program in the world to regularly use
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catapults on aircraft carriers.192 Moffett would continue to head the Bureau of Aviation until his
death in an airship accident in 1933.193

BOMBERS OR BATTLESHIPS?
While the navy defended its air program from the air corps, it updated its battleships with
new technology. Because of the Washington Conference, the navy was forbidden from building
new battleships and was forced instead to update and upgrade the existing ships. The navy
adopted a 7-year modernization plan, and designed most of the upgrades to protect the
battleships from air attack. Unlike the air corps, the navy had an internal research organization,
which allowed it to design many of these innovations and modernizations in-house, rather than
using external contractors.194 Six of the old coal-burning battleships were converted to oilburning engines. This allowed the navy to concentrate on supplying its ships with one type of
fuel, rather than having to transport both oil for new ships and coal for older ones. The oilburning engines also proved to be much more powerful and efficient. Builders strengthened the
decks of the ships and added more armor. To make guns better able to target aircraft, the navy
redesigned and replaced them with guns able to be aimed higher. Catapults designed to throw
reconnaissance planes into the air were installed. The first was installed on the battleship USS
Maryland in 1922.195 This new catapult design used smokeless powder rather than compressed
air to accelerate aircraft. It was a much less cumbersome design and used new alloys that
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allowed higher pressures and temperatures.196 “Duplex” radios were also developed. These
radios were able to receive several different messages on the same antenna while simultaneously
broadcasting. This allowed commanders a much better command and control ability while taking
up less equipment space.197 Finally, “blister compartments” were added below sea-level to
protect from torpedo attacks.198 The purpose of these compartments was not necessarily to
protect against a physical bomb hit, but a near miss. A bomb that explodes near the ship at the
waterline is actually more destructive because the explosion creates a shock wave, forcing the
water around the explosion towards the target ship with great force.199 All these advancements
played a role in the navy‟s developing technological superiority.
The navy had to deal with an internal conflict of doctrines between advocates of the
aircraft carrier and those who still favored the battleship as the main capital ship of the line.
Because of the construction restrictions on battleships and battlecruisers, only aircraft carriers
were built because they were the only capital ships the navy was permitted to build. However,
the proponents of the battleship assumed that when the treaty expired in 1932, carrier
construction would be replaced with battleship construction.200 Carrier proponents disagreed. Lt.
Comm. H.B. Grow, writing in the Naval Institute‟s publication Proceedings detailed the rather
ambiguous compromise to this conflict in 1921: that the battleship would be in great danger if
left unprotected by aircraft; but it still remained the main capital ship of the navy; that whichever
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fleet gained air superiority would most likely be the victor of a given engagement; that two
2,000-pound bombs would disable or destroy any ship; and that naval aviation would be essential
to fleet protection and must be built to the limits of the Washington Treaty.201
Lt. Comm. O.C. Badger wrote that this was not the first time the battleship had been
assumed obsolete; the same thing had been said of battleships when the torpedo boat was
invented in the 1870s. The torpedo boat was a small, fast ship designed to get inside a
battleship‟s defenses and launch torpedoes. They were somewhat effective, but the battleship
was still around 60 years after its invention. Badger believed it would be much the same thing
with the aircraft carrier and its airplanes. He also wrote that a carrier would be unable to take and
hold a position like a battleship could and that aircraft were essentially raiders, not main combat
units.202 Essentially, it was agreed that the battleship would remain the main ship of the fleet, but
the carrier would be an absolutely essential element in a battle group. Two years later, Lt. Forrest
Sherman expanded on this point, writing that the carrier‟s main goal must be to launch aircraft to
locate and destroy an enemy fleet‟s carriers in order to maintain air superiority.203
Highlighting the importance of air power to the navy was Comm. John Jackson of the US
Navy. In 1922, he submitted a 101-point analysis of all things air to the US Naval Institute. His
report included the capabilities of aircraft, types of aircraft, how to use aircraft (including
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scouting, fleet defense, and attack), the aircraft carriers‟ role as capital ships, the importance of
maintaining air superiority, what types of bombs to develop, and what weapons systems aircraft
should have.204
The first two carriers purpose-built for the navy were the Saratoga and the Lexington.205
These ships, built from the keels of two battlecruisers on which construction had been stopped to
meet the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty, massed around 33,000 tons and could carry
between seventy-five to ninety aircraft of various types.206 These carriers also had a small battery
of 8-inch guns and smaller anti-aircraft guns, all of which could only fire to the starboard side
due to the control tower on the port side. They also had the same blister compartments that had
been previously installed on battleships. As these were the first purpose-built carriers, they
underwent constant modification throughout their service careers, which included widening the
deck, removing the catapults due to lack of use, and the addition of anti-aircraft machine guns.207
The Lexington and Saratoga caused a debate between the carrier proponents, those who
favored building a few “heavy” carriers like the Saratoga-class and those who preferred a
smaller “light” carrier.208 As mentioned above, the navy was only permitted to build 135,000
tons of aircraft carriers, and the Lexington and Saratoga used up nearly half of that total tonnage.

204

Comm. John Jackson, “Employment and Tactics of Aircraft in Naval Warfare” USNI Proceedings 47 (1922):
1263-1297.
205
Designated as the Saratoga-Class
206
The two ships actually weighed in at around 35,500 tons, but a treaty loophole allowed 3,000 tons of defensive
equipment, which allowed the carriers to come in below treaty limits. The Washington Treaty limited each nation to
two carriers of over 27,000 tons, but no more than 33,000. Friedman, 43.
207
Friedman, Aircraft Carriers, 44-47.
208
A “class” refers to a ship design. Usually the class is named after the first ship built on a given design. For
example, the Nimitz was the first of ten Nimitz-class carriers.

77

This meant that they would only be able to build 4-5 carriers of comparable size to a Saratoga
(two 33,000-ton carriers and two or three 25-27,000-ton carriers), which limited the number of
places the navy could deploy at a given time. The alternative was that the navy could build a
larger number of light carriers with the remaining 69,000 available tons. The trade-off would be
that their landing decks would be less stable (a lighter ship would be less able to stay level in
heavy seas) and that they would hold fewer aircraft.
The navy designed a number of different carrier sizes to succeed the Saratoga-class, with
each plan projected to allow a certain number of ships to be built. For example, the navy could
build two 27,000 ton carriers, or five 13,800 ton carriers.209 Having smaller carriers meant that
each individual carrier would be less effective. However, having more carriers meant the navy
could deploy carriers to more fleets, or even multiple carriers to the same fleet. The latter option
would allow for some measure of redundancy should one carrier suffer damage, either due to
attack or a mechanical failure. It is worth noting that these plans were only a debate while the
naval treaties held. In the event of a war, tonnage would be unlimited and the navy would be free
to build full-sized carriers.210
In 1930, a compromise was reached in the debate with the creation of the Ranger-class, a
medium carrier about half the size of a Saratoga (14,500 tons), which could hold about eighty
planes.211 The carrier was able to carry this many aircraft because a larger percentage of its total
size was committed to hanger space, allowing it to carry nearly as many aircraft as the much
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larger Saratoga.212 In addition, the new design incorporated the flush-deck, a design used by
British carriers, which had come to be preferred by American pilots. The flush-deck incorporated
a wider deck, which made it the optimal design for launching aircraft and minimized the
potential for landing accidents. However, it also necessitated the removal of the defensive guns,
making the carrier dependent on its aircraft and the rest of the battle group for protection.213

NAVAL AVIATION SURGES AHEAD
While the navy was designing its second generation of purpose-built aircraft carriers,
significant technological advances developed within naval aviation. This new wave of planes
utilized the radial engine, an air-cooled engine developed for the air corps but adopted by the
navy‟s Bureau of Aeronautics. The radial engine was reliable for over 300 hours of flight time
between maintenance cycles, as opposed to earlier water-cooled engines which could only
operate for fifty hours. In addition, the radial engines were more powerful and could operate at
higher altitudes and for longer ranges. The additional power from the engine allowed aircraft
engineers to shorten an aircraft‟s wings. This was ideal for the navy as shorter wings meant a
smaller plane, thus making more room for additional aircraft on a given carrier. All-metal
propellers were beginning to become standard, and the NACA-designed Roots Supercharger
allowed for higher maximum altitudes and faster climbing.214
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Metal designs developed somewhat earlier in the navy than in the air corps for the very
important reason that naval aircraft had to deal with water, while generally air corps aircraft did
not. Properly treated metals have a much higher resistance to water damage than do wood and
cloth, especially salt water.215 Wood-and-cloth aircraft also absorbed water, weighing the aircraft
down.216 However, metal aircraft did prove much more difficult to repair. In the field, even
minor damage could down-check an aircraft.217
In1925, the navy developed the PN-9 patrol plane. This was the navy‟s first aircraft made
almost entirely of metal, rather than wood and cloth, and almost immediately set world records
for endurance.218 The navy considered long-range aerial reconnaissance crucial. They still
considered Japan to be their primary potential adversary and needed the ability to scout vast
stretches of the Pacific Ocean to locate Japanese fleets.219 In 1926, the efficiency of air-cooled
engines had increased by four-hundred percent over wartime engines, the size had been reduced
by one-third their wartime size, and they had finally overtaken water-cooled engines in fuel
economy and horsepower-to-weight ratio.220 Also in 1926, the navy stopped purchasing new
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designs that were not entirely metal, although most of these new designs would not be seen until
the 1930s.221
Because of these improvements in engine power and efficiency and the development of
sturdier wings, dive bombing developed in this period, although it would not reach its full
potential until the all-metal aircraft of the 1930s came into development. Once all-metal aircraft
were developed, the additional strength given by the metal frame allowed aircraft to move faster
and turn more sharply; both of these abilities are vital for dive-bombing. However, by 1927, it
had become apparent that a few dive bombers could strike a battleship several times before the
battleship‟s anti-air turrets (and, more specifically, its gunners) could target them. Adm. Sims
claimed that a small fast carrier launching dive bombers with a 200-mile range could “destroy or
disable a battleship alone” and the carrier was “a capital ship of much greater offensive power
than any battleship.”222 Although a single dive bomber can only carry one 1000-pound bomb, it
can hit its target with near-100 percent accuracy from a range of 150 miles. Battleships, on the
other hand, could fire up to 16,000 tons of ordinance at a time. But at long range (approximately
seventeen miles), it could only hit with 5% accuracy – about 800 pounds of explosives. This
means, given one shot at a target, the dive bomber could deliver more ordinance at nearly ten
times the range.223 This had the additional effect of forcing battleship proponents to develop
more effective anti-air batteries to counter possible air attacks.
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Navy engineers also installed radiophones in aircraft near the end of the decade, which
greatly improved the effectiveness of coordinated movements between aircraft and ships. By the
end of the 1920s, navy strategists considered aircraft as primarily offensive weapons that should
be used en masse against enemy carriers, preferably before enemy aircraft could be deployed.
Commanders also considered aircraft the best defense against other aircraft, but anti-air cannons
were being rapidly developed.224 Lt. Comm. R.K. Turner developed a method of anti-aircraft fire
control using multiple ships in order to maximize the chances of hitting a target aircraft,
especially torpedo planes.225 Because of this focus on both offense and defense, the navy made
significantly more progress in the development of fighter aircraft than the air corps in the
interwar period.226 The navy also committed to funding large-scale training exercises to develop
unified tactics between air and surface units. These exercises often contained large sections of
the fleet and hundreds of aircraft, and were scheduled on a regular basis.227

THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION
The last years of the 1920s saw the beginnings of a naval arms race in the development
and construction of cruisers. Cruisers and destroyers were unaffected by the Washington Naval
Treaty and were becoming bigger and more powerful, especially those built by the United States
and Japan. The Butler Cruiser Acts of 1924 and 1929 allowed for the construction of several
American cruisers and forced Britain and Japan to follow suit by building more cruisers of their
224
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own. The Geneva Conference in 1927 attempted to curtail this arms race before it really got
started, but the three major powers, Japan, Britain, and America, were unable to reach an
agreement as to the total tonnage allowed for cruisers, and Japan was reluctant to once again
agree to a 5:5:3 ratio. As a result, the Conference achieved nothing, and building proceeded
unabated.228
The onset of the Great Depression changed the dynamic of international naval relations.
None of the major naval powers had the ability to keep the funding for naval construction at the
level it had been previously, which made them more open to renewed discussions about limiting
the tonnage and construction of cruisers. It even temporarily convinced the naval brass that
budget cuts were unavoidable. The London Naval Conference of 1930 was convened to address
these armament issues. The American diplomats disagreed with the navy in terms of the potential
threat posed by Japan and did not believe that Japan posed a credible threat to China, let alone
the rest of the Pacific.
As a result, the Americans, British, and Japanese reached a compromise, allowing the
Americans to build 14 heavy cruisers between 1930 and 1936, with at least three to be built after
1934. Submarine tonnage would be equal between the powers, and a 10:10:7 ratio was set for
destroyers.229 The British attempted to downgrade the allowable tonnage of a cruiser from
10,000 tons to 7,000, but both Pacific powers rejected this plan. The navy saw the 10:10:7
compromise as a setback, believing that a 5:5:3 ratio was a necessity across all classes. However,
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Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. William Pratt urged Congress to ratify the treaty. His
reasoning was that both Japan and Britain had already reached their allotment for cruisers, and
America would be able to build 14 more of them with the latest technology. The treaty gave
“absolute parity” between the United States and Great Britain across all ship types and extended
the agreements of the Washington Naval Conference for another five years.230
Despite opposition from the Navy League, a lobby of civilians and naval veterans
dedicated to supporting the navy, the treaty was ratified. President Hoover then further slashed
the naval budget and put a one-year halt on construction in 1932.231 In addition, Hoover forced
Pratt to separate the fleet into thirds, and rotate a third of the fleet into inactive reserves every
year. This would save about fifty million dollars in operating costs, but would leave an already
undermanned fleet even thinner.232
When Franklin Roosevelt took over the presidency in 1933, he brought a short attention
span and an incomplete view of foreign affairs to the navy. The one good thing he did was
appoint Senator Claude Swanson as the Secretary of the Navy. Swanson largely left the navy
alone and let the admirals run it. His contributions to the navy consisted of lobbying for funding
from Congress and building the navy up to its treaty limits.233
Initially, Roosevelt continued Hoover‟s policy of the one-third reserve, but his policy of
deficit spending and Japan‟s continued aggression in China quickly brought it to an end. In the
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1933 National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA), Roosevelt earmarked $238 million dollars for
naval construction. Thirty-three ships were planned, mostly destroyers, and both carriers and
cruisers were built up to their treaty limits. Battleship modernization neared completion and the
new CNO, Adm. William Standley, prepared to replace the navy‟s World War I-era battleships.
The navy stated that this construction would employ over 18,000 Americans and would impact
nearly every area of industry. In addition, 85 percent of the money spent on new construction
went to pay the workers. This made the new construction easier to accept even by the more
staunch isolationists.234
Rear Adm. Ernest King took over the Bureau of Aeronautics in 1933, when Rear Adm.
Moffett was killed in a dirigible accident. King effectively ended the navy‟s airship program and
began to focus on replacing the navy‟s remaining biplanes with the new metal monoplanes.
Torpedo bombers were developed and used the new Norden bombsight. The Norden bombsight
would be made famous by the US Army Air Force during World War II, but Norden originally
designed it for the navy. The sight used a combination of an optical bombsight and an automatic
pilot – up to this point, bombsights had been jury-rigged by the aircraft crew.235 King also
dismissed many of the carrier‟s secondary assignments such as reconnaissance, submarine
hunting, and land attack, focusing instead on capital-ship assault and fleet defense.236
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THE END OF THE TREATY FLEET
In 1934, Roosevelt authorized the construction of another 102 ships, with the belief that
he would have to cancel the authorization after the Second London Naval Conference; the
conference was to take place later that year. Japan denounced the Washington Naval Treaty in
1934, and made it perfectly clear that it would not renew the London Treaty of 1930. In
December of 1935, when Japan demanded naval parity across all ship types, the conference
rapidly fell apart. Japan walked out of the conference, and the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France signed a weak treaty that in theory extended the terms of both the
Washington and London Treaties for another decade, that none of the signing parties pretended
to observe.237
Because Japan began to expand its navy without inhibitions imposed by international
treaties, Roosevelt was forced to propose the 1935 Emergency Relief Act, which authorized the
construction of an aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and various smaller types, and Congress
increased the navy‟s budget to nearly $100 million over its pre-Washington Treaty budget, to
$490 million, with $26 million earmarked specifically for naval aviation.238 Britain soon backed
out of the largely meaningless Second London Naval Treaty in 1936, and all the major naval
powers were free to build as many ships as they pleased at whatever size they wished as of
January 1st, 1936.239
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In January 1936, Roosevelt announced plans to build a navy able to defend the country
from an offensive war, and that he would begin construction on two new battleships, the first
new battleships to be built in nearly two decades.240 These two battleships would be of the North
Carolina-class, a brand new class of battleship, and would be built with 16-inch guns as opposed
to the 14-inch guns allowed by the treaties. This was permissible because the treaties had an
escape clause written in allowing other nations to break said treaties once another nation had.
Because Japan was building battleships with 16-inch guns, nothing prevented America and
Britain from doing so as well.
By this point, it was increasingly obvious that a war, or at the very least a showdown,
between Japan and the United States was brewing. However, the navy had collectively believed a
Pacific war had been inevitable for decades.241 European nations began to rearm as well,
especially Britain and Germany. Japanese expansionism into China was becoming more
pronounced. However, Roosevelt was unprepared to do anything about it in 1936, and his
“strategic planning” was often inconsistent and nonsensical.
By the end of 1938, the US Navy had a total of 533 warships, a 100-ship increase from
the year before. Most of these ships were built out of the funds granted by the Emergency Relief
Act and the NIRA, and included three carriers: the Yorktown, the Enterprise, and the Wasp. This
allowed the navy to focus on new battleships, and Roosevelt approved funding to build two new
South Dakota-class battleships per year for two years. After two years, newer classes were
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developed and the navy stopped producing South Dakota-class ships. In addition, funding was
received for two Hornet-class carriers, nine cruisers, twenty-three destroyers, two submarines,
and one thousand aircraft.242 Finally, in 1939, Congress approved the construction of two Iowaclass battleships and the widening of the Panama Canal to allow these new ships to use it, in
addition to a budget of $770,473,241. These Iowa-class ships were arguably the most successful
battleships in history, as they remained in service for nearly 50 years, and their nine 16-inch
main cannons gave them one of the most powerful broadsides of the war.243
There were a number of issues in the development of technology during this final period,
and many of them were the fault of politicians rather than the navy itself. Because of the large
push to produce capital ships such as battleships and large carriers to prepare for war, the navy
largely ignored the construction of lighter ships, especially cruisers; between 1936 and 1939,
only one additional cruiser was laid down for construction. This is somewhat understandable, as
the newest battleship in the fleet was built in 1918 – most of the cruisers and all of the carriers
were a decade younger.244 The result was a fleet full of fast, modern battleships, but very few
new lighter units that were needed to protect them. In fact, the new battleships could outrun these
smaller units, meaning that they must either slow down to allow the support ships to keep pace,
or travel without a protective screen of smaller ships. In addition, aircraft carriers were still
relegated to designs drawn up under the treaty program, meaning that their size was restricted.
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The end of the treaties meant the end of these restrictions, but new designs lagged behind due to
the renewed focus on battleships.245
Despite the priority shifting away from smaller ships in the late 1930s, there were many
new technological innovations that were implemented on the new construction. Radar was
installed on several destroyers and cruisers (as well as on four battleships) in order to spot
incoming aircraft, although doctrine would not be established on its use until the war. The Mark
XIV torpedo was developed with a range of over 9,000 yards and a top speed of nearly fifty
knots. In addition, it no longer relied on impact to detonate; instead, it had a “magnetic
exploder,” or proximity fuse, which allowed the torpedo to do damage on direct hits and near
misses. All these new technologies would greatly influence and aid the navy‟s war-fighting
ability during World War II.246
The largest gap in naval preparedness coming out of the interwar period was in support
ships. After the collapse of the naval disarmament treaties, carriers and battleships were built
stronger and faster than ever before. In the case of battleships, they were fast enough to outrun
their own screen. Eight of these fast battleships were laid down between 1936 and 1939, but only
one cruiser fast enough to keep up was authorized for construction. This left the navy critically
unprepared numerically to fight a two-ocean war.247
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In addition, the possibility of a two-ocean war came as a surprise to the US Navy. Since
World War I, the navy had focused on Japan as its most-likely opponent and had planned its
strategy around that fact in Plan ORANGE. The rise in European tensions forced a paradigm
shift in the navy and Plan ORANGE was scrapped in favor of the new RAINBOW Plans, which
were designed to meet a number of different possible conflicts, including a simultaneous war in
the Atlantic and the Pacific. These new plans required a larger navy, and those numbers would
not be available until after World War II began.248
Despite not being prepared numerically, the navy had all the technology it would need to
fight World War II on equal terms. It had both modern aircraft carriers and battleships and the
technology to build the ships needed to support them (although the number built was small). The
blame for the navy‟s lack of numerical power can be laid at the feet of isolationist politicians and
later, Roosevelt himself, as well as the disarmament treaties to which the navy had, in part,
agreed. Despite the isolationists‟ attempt to limit the navy‟s fighting power, it had developed and
deployed the aircraft carrier in order to make up for the limited tonnage it was allowed. The navy
had devised a cohesive strategy for both aircraft and surface ships to work together. Finally, the
ships that the navy was permitted to build both during and after the treaty system were some of
the most modern in the world, and those built before the treaty system were constantly updated
with new technology to keep them as modern as possible. Also, when war appeared on the
horizon, the United States was prepared to initiate a massive building program to bring the navy
up to strength. Because of this, the navy was able to enter World War II having developed nearly
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all the technology it would need to effectively fight a two-ocean war. The only remaining task
was to deploy the new technologies together en masse.
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CONCLUSION
The twenty year period between the world wars heralded in an astounding number of new
technologies. The army, air corps, and navy, to varying degrees of success, all made progress on
a number of technological fronts between 1919 and 1939. They did this despite the plethora of
barriers erected in their path, be they political, budgetary, or organizational. The success or
failure of these military branches to develop new technology cannot be accounted for simply by
funding, individuals, or organizations, but rather, by a combination of all these factors.
The army was the branch most adversely affected by Congress‟s isolationist policies,
organizational inefficiency, and budget cuts. The National Defense Act of 1920 not only severely
cut both the army‟s manpower and budget, but also brought back an organizational system that
had proven inefficient and had been replaced by a more effective, top-down structure. The
actions taken by Congress set the tone for the rest of the interwar period for the army, by not
allowing it the manpower to properly perform its duties and reinstituting an obsolete command
strategy and giving power back to the department heads, rather than consolidating power in the
army chief of staff as Gen. Peyton March envisioned. Although most of the chiefs of staff during
the interwar period favored modernization of the army, many of the department heads did not.
This was further exacerbated by a lack of proper funding, making it nearly impossible for the
army to manufacture any technological gains they did achieve. The two tanks designed in the
1920s, the Medium A and the Christie, were put aside in favor of the armored car at the
discretion of the chief of the infantry division. The standard firearm for the army was still the
1903 Springfield, despite the development of the M1. Finally, due to the lack of a standard truck
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design and a slashed training budget, in addition to obsolete weaponry, the army failed to form a
cohesive strategy involving mechanized weaponry and motorized transport. At the end of the
interwar period, the army had not made significant progress on tanks, artillery, mechanization, or
small arms. What little modern material it did have were in short supply and largely untested in
the field.
The air corps, despite being part of the army, finished the interwar period in stark contrast
to its parent branch. By partially separating itself from the army, it overcame many of the army‟s
organizational inefficiencies, and a good marketing campaign allowed the air corps to gain
funding to develop “defensive” strategic bombers. Billy Mitchell‟s influence on the air service at
the end of World War I gave the army airmen a sense of purpose and identity. His publicity
stunts made the air service, the public, and the government aware of the potential of military
aircraft, be it defending the heartland or sinking battleships off the coast. Even after Mitchell‟s
resignation, the air service and later the air corps remained a cohesive unit under the leadership
of Gen. Mason Patrick and his successors.
After the formation of the air corps, Patrick made army aviation a nearly closed society,
promoting from within, forming a culture, and setting goals apart from the army. Because of this
unified command structure and a cohesive goal, it was able to find a niche for itself within the
army and then pitch itself as a defensive organization apart from the army. The idea of strategic
bombing (being able to attack targets far behind enemy lines), was very appealing to the military
establishment. Even more importantly, being able to market this idea with the purpose of
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defending the coastline, rather than attacking cities, made the air corps politically viable. These
changes in presentation allowed the air corps to secure funding independent of the rest of the
army.
Using a combination of this funding, plus government organizations such as the NACA
and private corporations such as the Martin Company and Boeing, the air corps made significant
technological progress, advancing from wood-and-cloth aircraft at the beginning of the 1920s to
all-metal, single-wing aircraft at the end of the 1930s. However, the air corps did not make
significant advancements in fighter aircraft until the very end of the interwar period, assuming
that its bombers would be able to either outfly or outgun any defenders. The fighters it did have
were either too slow to keep up with the new bombers, or too underpowered to reach the
altitudes where bombers flew. The P-38 would eventually become a serviceable fighter during
World War II, but at the end of the 1930s it was still a test project plagued with mechanical
problems. Overall, the air corps made significant progress during the interwar period, but there
remained some oversights in 1939.
The navy began the Great War with several of the same problems as the army: a system
of bureaus dominated the command structure and a culture of treating peacetime and wartime
differently in terms of preparation and readiness. At the end of World War I, the navy dealt with
these problems immediately during the 1920 Senate Naval Investigation, taking power from the
bureau chiefs and giving it to the chief of naval operations. In addition, they committed
themselves to preparing for war at all times through constant upgrades and regularly scheduled,
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large-scale training exercises. These organizational factors allowed the navy to overcome both
funding deficits and tonnage limits.
In the wake of World War I, the navy was affected by a series of international treaties
designed to weaken navies to the point that they could not be used offensively. As a result,
tonnages were strictly limited for capital ships, such as battleships, battlecruisers, and aircraft
carriers. In 1930, smaller ships such as cruisers and destroyers became limited as well. Ironically,
these two treaties actually fostered many technological innovations. The navy responded to these
handicaps by forming a culture of quality over quantity. Existing ships were upgraded constantly
during the interwar period with better guns, armor, and engines. The navy converted almost
entirely to oil-based engines, rather than coal-fired engines.
In addition, the navy began to further develop the aircraft carrier, especially after Billy
Mitchell‟s tests proved that aircraft could sink battleships. These carriers had to conform to a
compromise between holding enough aircraft to be effective, and fitting into tonnage limits to
allow the navy to build enough of them to put at least one carrier in each fleet. As a result, the
carriers built in the interwar period were somewhat undersized, but contained all the design
elements needed to build full-sized carriers once the naval treaties fell apart in the mid-1930s.
The navy also developed their own aircraft independent of the air corps, designed to defend and
attack ships. Because of these different goals, the navy actually developed better fighter aircraft
than the air corps prior to World War II. The navy also developed all-metal aircraft long before
the air corps, due to metal‟s superior durability in water.
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Because of naval command‟s obsession with improving the quality of its hardware during
the 1920s and 1930s, when the naval treaties dissolved, the navy was prepared to build entirely
modern battleships that were stronger, faster, and better armed than ever. However, due to the
twenty-year hiatus on battleship construction, the navy focused solely on building battleships for
the final years before World War II. They built no new carriers and very few smaller ships like
cruisers and destroyers, leaving them with a small number of modern ships of these types. This
was not a technological oversight, however. All the technology was available to build larger
aircraft carriers and faster cruisers; the navy simply had not built them yet.
The argument could be made for either the navy or the air corps in terms of which service
improved most technologically between 1919 and 1939. Both the air corps and the navy
considered the development of cutting-edge aircraft critical. The navy developed an entirely new
class of ship, the aircraft carrier, to transport and launch these new aircraft. It also vastly
improved the performance of its more conventional arsenal despite the restrictions placed upon it
by the international naval treaties and budget constraints. The air corps, on the other hand,
effectively invented itself out of nothing, starting as the air service, a division of the signal corps,
in 1919 to being a largely independent military branch in 1939. Technologically, it had advanced
from being a small group of wood and cloth observational biplanes to a significant force of allmetal bombers.
The army, hardest hit by budget cuts and manpower restrictions do to isolationist
domestic policies, was also the clear loser in terms of technological development. Most of the
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army still used the same weaponry as they had at the end of World War I for both artillery and
small-arms. What few technological developments that were made were not produced in large
quantity and were never tested in large-scale maneuvers. As a result, the army ended the interwar
period largely unprepared for World War II.
There are a number of comparisons to be drawn between the interwar period and the
current military situation. With a tenuous economy and the potential for upcoming budget cuts to
the military, it is more important than ever for today‟s commanders to look to the past to see
what mistakes were made, which were averted, and the best ways to maintain a strong and
prepared military presence. In the face of budgetary shortfalls, the most important factor is to
have a unified command structure, headed by one department, rather than having a collective of
different bureaus interested only on pursuing their own agenda at the expense of all others.
Equally as important is having common goals throughout the organization. In the air corps, it
was carving out a specialized niche, followed by the development of strategic bombing. In the
navy, the goal became to be ready for war with cutting edge weaponry, despite the challenge of
international treaties and budget cuts. Finally, many interwar success stories were due to civilian
agencies and corporations working with and for the military. The air corps and navy each
realized that the private sector could be a boon to a research and development programs. Both
the air corps and navy relied heavily on civilian aviation to develop new aircraft and associated
technologies. United, these lessons as learned from the interwar period provide not only
explanations for differing levels of success by each branch, but also provide a blueprint for future
technological development for today‟s military, regardless of obstacles.
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